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ABSTRACT 
The Role of Institutions in State-Private Sector Interaction:  
A Case Study of Private Sector Participation in the Amman Water Sector, Jordan  
S. M. Steiner 
Master of Administration, Mini-Thesis 
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 
 
This research investigates the performance of private sector participation (PSP) in the water 
sector from a governance perspective. It is concerned with the role that institutions play in the 
interaction between the state and the private sector, which occurs with respect to the regulation and 
implementation of such PSP arrangements. The research takes place within the context of a 
development debate and practice, which identifies water as a key poverty issue in a substantial part 
of the developing countries, which advocates private sector participation as a remedy to inadequate 
water management and which acknowledges good governance as a crucial requirement for 
development. Nevertheless, few studies have scrutinized the impact of governance and institutions 
on the outcome of PSP arrangements in the water sector. Most research on the performance of PSP 
arrangements has examined exogenous and endogenous determinants, such as the price mechanism 
and the property rights allocation, but these factors proved unsatisfactory as explaining variables in 
the context of natural resource management. 
 
To contribute to filling a gap in research this study aims at evaluating the impact of 
institutional frameworks on the outcome of private sector participation in water supply and 
sanitation through a case study of the Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Service in 
the Amman Governorate, Jordan. At the end of the 1990s the quality of water supply and sanitation 
in the Jordanian capital Amman was unsatisfactory, as supply was insufficient and entailed high 
costs. Therefore, in 1999, the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan contracted a 
private joint venture to improve water service provision in the Amman Governorate. The research 
takes into account the specific institutional framework for the mentioned arrangement in Amman, 
which is comprised of the national judicial and political institutions, the specific regulatory 
institutions as well as relevant international institutions. These institutions are not limited to laws 
and regulations only, but also include informal institutions such as traditions. The specific 
objective of this study is to show how the institutional framework of a transaction affects 
regulatory processes by abating and amplifying the potential for opportunistic behavior of the 
contracting parties, and thereby affecting the performance of a privately operated water utility.  
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The examination of the institutional framework of the Amman Management Contract 
revealed that mainly judicial and international institutions and specific contract rules were 
constraining the discretion of the contracting parties. Political checks and balances were 
insufficiently established and the regulatory institutions of the water sector were set up in an 
improper way. The field study discovered that the resulting discretionary power of certain actors 
was used opportunistically, which had a detrimental effect on the outcome of the PSP arrangement. 
Nevertheless the overall performance of the arrangement was good from which the general insight 
was drawn that regulatory credibility may be developed even in unpropitious environments. 
However, to be able to judge upon the effect of governance and institutions on a planned or 
existing PSP arrangement each time a complex assessment of the respective institutional 
environment is necessary. This is because institutions may not be seen as independent building 
blocks but rather form a network which is likely to be unique for each country and situation.  
 
The mini-thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 an outline of the study and its 
problem background is provided. Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review and sets out the 
theoretical framework and research hypotheses of the study. Chapter 3 outlines the research design 
and methodology that was used for the study.  Chapter 4 provides background detail on the 
Jordanian political, economic and social situation, on the issues pertaining to the water sector, and 
on the Amman water contract.  Chapter 5 provides a description and analysis of the main research 
findings.  Chapter 6 provides a summary as well as final conclusions and considerations.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE 
Unsatisfactory access to water supply and sanitation is a key poverty issue which 
is affecting a substantial part of the developing countries.1 Without a considerable 
improvement in the delivery of water and sanitation services this situation is expected to 
further deteriorate. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is struck by one 
of the most acute water shortages as most of the countries of the region are arid to semi-
arid environments. More than half of the water resources in the MENA countries are 
brought in from outside the region and what makes it more critical is that most of the 
water resources in this region have already been accessed.2 However, the public sector 
in many developing countries so far has been unable to manage this development as can 
be seen from the unsatisfactory provision of water and sanitation in the field.3  
This significant and urgent global problem raised my interest and motivated me 
to contribute with a case study to the ongoing theoretical debates on this issue. The 
universal development debate of the past two decades has increasingly identified good 
governance as a key requirement for development. Accordingly, the joint initiative on 
Good Governance for Development in the Arab Countries, launched by the UNDP, 
OECD and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 2005, identified the low quality and 
poor infrastructure of public services, such as water supply and sanitation, as a main 
challenge to governance.4 As a remedy to inadequate water sector management, the 
initiative advocated the participation of the private sector in water supply and sanitation.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Private Sector Participation (PSP) in its various forms has often been suggested 
as a way out of ineffective and inefficient management systems, inadequate technology, 
and the lack of investment. However, as water involves the notions of a public good and 
                                                 
1 cf. Carter, Richard C.; Danert, Kerstin., 2003, p.1 
2 cf. Abu-Zeid, Mahoud, 2003, p.1 
3 cf. Al-Hmoud, Richard C.; Edwards, Jeffrey, 2004, p.1 
4 cf. United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p.1 
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a human need, PSPs in the water sector stir political emotions like little else. What is 
more, after more than 15 years of private sector participation in water services, 
frequently promoted through the development agencies, the results of empirical studies 
on the effects of private sector participation remain generally inconclusive, showing 
successes and failures. The early enthusiasm of the 1990s for private sector participation 
has therefore begun to fade away. Nevertheless, PSPs – though in a more mature way, 
taking some of the key lessons learned into account – are still promoted by their  
advocates as a means of improving water supply and sanitation.5 
The inconclusive record of PSPs in the water sector suggests that private sector 
participation does not per se contribute to an improvement of water supply and 
sanitation services. It rather indicates that the success of a PSP is determined by other 
exogenous and endogenous determinants. Further investigation into the topic showed 
that although the importance of governance and institutions for development has been 
widely acknowledged, little research has examined the performance of PSP 
arrangements in the water sector from a governance or institutional perspective. Most 
research focused on investigating issues such as the price mechanism and property 
rights allocation.  However, these factors have proved unsatisfactory as explainatory 
variables in the context of natural resource management.6 Equally alarming is the fact 
that this lack in theory has recurred in development cooperation practice. A report of the 
World Bank’s evaluation department in 2003 showed that only 37% of the water and 
sanitation projects with a PSP component were also concerned with the public 
regulation of such arrangements.7 In the meantime, two thirds of the projects fell back 
on contract regulation, thereby ignoring important governance and institutional factors. 
Merely outsourcing the provision of water and sanitation services to a private provider 
is clearly not a guarantee for improved water governance. The performance of the 
private operator is affected by the interaction between the state and the private operator. 
This interaction again is shaped by the broader institutional and regulatory framework 
of the PSP arrangement within which the parties operate.  
It is the relative lack of previous research focus on the role of institutional 
variables in the operation and performance of private sector participation in sectors such 
                                                 
5 cf. Marin, Philippe; Izaguirre, Ada Karina, 2006, p.1 
6 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2004, p.23 
7 cf. Rothenberger, Dieter, 2004, p.20 
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as water, and the need to address this by case studies that take such varibales into 
account, that forms the main research problem for this study. 
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES  AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The purpose or overall aim of the study is to evaluate the impact of the   
institutional framework (political, judicial, administrative, regulatory, and international)  
on the outcome of private sector participation in water supply and sanitation through a 
case study of the Amman Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Service in 
the Amman Governorate, Jordan. 
Drawing in particular on the work of Levy and Spiller on PSPs in the 
telecommunication sector, the specific objective of the study is assess how the 
institutional environment of a transaction affects regulatory processes by abating or 
amplifying the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part of the contracting parties, 
thereby affecting the performance of a privately operated water utility. The general 
hypothesis to be tested in the case study is the following:  
 If the potential of political and administrative actors as well as the private 
operator to manipulate or exploit the contract are not sufficiently constrained by 
judicial, political, international and regulatory institutions, the performance of a 
privately operated water utility will be negatively affected.   
Key research questions that will be pursued by the study include the following: 
• Background knowledge: What is the country’s economic, political and social 
situation? How is the Jordanian water sector situated? What are the main 
elements of the Amman Water Management Contract?  
• Independent variables: What kind of political, administrative and judicial 
institutions exist in Jordan?  What kind of international institutions affect the 
contract? What kind of substantive constraints have been established?  
• Intermediary variables: What incentives and potential do political/ 
administrative actors and the private operator have to manipulate or exploit 
the contract? What is the degree of occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by 
the contracting parties? Have the regulatory, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms been effective?  
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• Dependent variable: How successful has the operator been in fulfilling 
obligations and attaining goals and targets set in the contract, and to what 
extent was performance influenced by the institutional framework within 
which it operated?  
 
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A detailed literature review and theoretical framework is provided in Chapter 2 
of this mini-thesis. This first of all outlines key issues related to water governance, 
management and development.  It then provides an overview of research, particularly 
within the field of transaction cost anlsyis, that has been carried out with particular  
regard to the determinants of the performance of private sector participation in public 
infrastructure.  This is followed by the presentation of the theoretical framework of the 
study, which draws quite heavily on the concept of institutions and the new institutional 
economic approach developed by Levy and Spiller. The main research hypotheses of 
the study are then set out.  These are dervied from the theoretical models examined 
earlier in Chapter 2. 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The case which was chosen for this study is the Management Contract for Water 
and Wastewater Services in the Amman Governorate, Jordan. This case is significant as 
Jordan is a highly water-scarce country. In the arid Middle Eastern region Jordan is a 
pioneer regarding the implementation of private sector participation in the water sector 
and the contract under observation was the first one to be implemented in this country. 
It is also significant because the PSP option of a management contract, of the Jordanian 
kind, is increasingly becoming one of the preferred options for many private water 
companies, rather than the larger-scale and higher-risk forms of PSP (such as lease 
arrangements and concessions) that were more popular in the past.8  It is hoped that the 
research findings of this study will provide lessons for policy makers in the water and 
                                                 
8 cf. Marin, Philippe; Izaguirre, Ada Karina, 2006, p.1 
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related sectors in developing countries, as well as for academics in terms of future 
research. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research will be largely qualitative and will rely in part on desk research.  
This will take the form of a detailed literature review of contemporary issues and 
theoretical debates surrounding the issue of outsourcing and public-private contracting, 
both in general and in the water sector more specifically.  It will also include a detailed 
description and  analysis of key documentary sources on the Amman Water Contract, 
produced, for example, by the World Bank, the United Nations and LEMA (the private 
contractor - Suez Lyonnaise Des Eaux and Montgomery Watson Arabtech Jardaneh).  
Such documentary information will be backed up by semi-structured interviews with 
key stakeholders in Jordan, selected on the basis of their expertise and familiarity with 
the subject matter. Two sets of interview guidelines were prepared for these interviews:  
the first covering questions about the macro-institutional environment that were 
addressed primarily to members of political foundations and NGOs. The second set was 
comprised of questions related to water sector regulation and the management contract, 
which were addressed primarily to Jordanian government officials, water experts and 
donors.  Greater detail about the research design and methodology is provided in 
Chapter 3 of this study. 
 
1.7 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The mini-thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 an outline of the study and 
its problem background is provided. Chapter 2 provides a detailed literature review and 
sets out the theoretical framework and research hypotheses of the study. Chapter 3 
outlines the research design and methodology that was used for the study.  Chapter 4 
provides background detail on the Jordanian political, economic and social situation, on 
the issues pertaining to the water sector in Jordan, and on the Amman water contract.  
Chapter 5 provides a description and analysis of the main research findings.  And 
Chapter 6 provides a summary as well as final conclusions and considerations.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into four sections.  The first section reviews the literature 
and outlines key issues related to water governance, management and development.  It 
also outlines different models of drinking water provision, including different forms of 
private sector participation.  The second section provides an overview of research that 
has already been carried out with regard to the determinants of the performance of 
private sector participation in public infrastructure.  The third section presents the 
theoretical framework of the study, which draws quite heavily on the concept of 
institutions and the new institutional economic approach developed by Levy and Spiller 
in the context of the telecommunications sector. The fourth section sets out the main 
research hypotheses of the study, dervied from the theoretical models examined in this 
chapter. 
2.2 WATER GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1  Institutions and Governance 
The introduction of reform-undertakings such as private sector participation has 
been advocated by the UNDP-initiative on Good Governance for Development in the 
Arab Countries as a remedy to some challenges that governance is facing. But what is 
governance and how does it relate to institutions?  
The term governance is one of the more elastic concepts in the public and 
academic discourse. A broad definition by the World Bank defines governance as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”.9 This means 
that formal and informal institutions (traditions) form the framework by which deployed 
actors exercise their authority. The World Bank concept identifies three dimensions of 
governance: first, “the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
                                                 
9 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.2 
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replaced”; second, “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies”; and third, “the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”.10 The first 
dimension refers to the institutions that determine how actors are deployed and replaced 
and in which way citizens participate in this process. The second dimension is 
concerned with those institutions that affect the effectiveness of policy-making and the 
regulatory quality of policies. The third dimension deals with the “respect of citizens for 
the institutions which govern their interactions”, measured by the rule of law and the 
control of corruption.11 The economics and comparative political economy literature 
have found a multitude of manifestations that reveal a link between institutional 
frameworks and governance outcomes, such as the effect of political checks and 
balances “on regulatory and fiscal performance” or “the effects of democratic 
institutions on a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes”.12 Consequently, a proper 
institutional framework is crucial for the social and economic development of a country 
as well as the effectiveness of international development assistance.13 
2.2.2 Water Supply, Poverty Reduction and Economic Development 
In recognition of the urgent water problems which developing countries are 
facing, the aim of considerably improving the provision of clean drinking water and 
adequate sanitation especially to the poor was included in the year 2000 in the 
Millennium Development Goals.14 The urgency of this situation is demonstrated by the 
fact that the world’s demand for water resources has been growing much faster than the 
world population itself.15 Today one fifth of the world’s population does not have 
access to safe and reliably provided drinking water and half of the world’s population 
does not have access to sanitation. This results in 3-4 million deaths every year due to 
waterborne diseases.16 
The importance of water for development, however, is not limited to nutrition 
and hygiene alone. An insufficient supply of water and sanitation affects further poverty 
dimensions. Poverty can be understood as a lack of essential economic, human, 
                                                 
10 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.2 
11 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.3f. 
12 Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.21 
13cf. Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.25 
14 cf. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/  
15 cf. Cosgrove, William J.; Rijsberman, Frank R., 2000, p.19 
16 cf. Cosgrove, William J.; Rijsberman, Frank R., 2000, p.20 
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political, safety-related and socio-cultural capabilities.17 This also shows the ties of the 
poverty concept with the concept of development. Development can be defined with the 
words of Amartya Sen as the expansion of “the capabilities of people [...] that is, the 
substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she values”.18  
With regard to the human dimension an insufficient access to water and 
sanitation affects also the chances for education, especially for women and girls. They 
are predominantly in charge of fetching and sometimes cleaning the water, which is 
time-consuming and has led in many countries to the underrepresentation of girls in 
schools.  Tightly connected to this problem are the people’s economic chances. A lack 
of education and health affects their income. In addition, a shortage of water may 
restrict the opportunities for the establishment of small enterprises on the community 
level, which need water for their operation.  The lack of political freedoms make people 
powerless against an unfair distribution of water, polluted supplies and deficient 
services, which may strike especially the poor and thus increase the before mentioned 
negative impacts of an insufficient water supply. Finally, with regard to the safety-
related dimension, an insecure or insufficient supply of water may provoke violent 
water conflicts on local, regional and international levels as well as inner-family 
violence.  
In addition to these direct effects of an insufficient access to water supply and 
sanitation on the people, the long term and macroeconomic effects of efficient water 
services on the development of a country also have to be taken into account. For 
example, to what extent does an efficient and profitable operation reduce the burden on 
the governmental budget? Furthermore, where water resources are depleted over the 
replenishment rate, increases in efficiency may help to converge towards the goal of a 
sustainably managed water sector.19 Poor people are disproportionately affected by 
insufficient and unsafe water supply and sanitation, as they have less access to 
medication, less storage capabilities, and less means to purchase water from alternative 
sources.  Improved water services therefore may contribute to poverty alleviation.. 
Finally to what extent do improved water services increase the business productivity 
through long term benefits of improved education and health, a higher resilience of 
                                                 
17 cf. OECD/DAC, 2001, p.31f. 
18 Sen, Amartya, 1983, p.755 and Sen, Amartya, 1999, p. 87, quoted from Durth, Rainer; Körner, Heiko; 
Michaelowa, Katharina 2002, p.8 
19 cf. Shirley, Mary M.; Ménard, Claude, 2002, p.3f. 
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agriculture and food production to rainfall variability, and industrial development as  
industry is dependent on reliable water services?  Sufficient, reliable and efficient water 
services of a high quality therefore also significantly contribute to economic growth.20 
2.2.3 Alternative Modes of Drinking Water Provision 
Now that the interrelation between water, poverty and development has been 
pointed out, it is necessary to clarify how these problems may be addressed. With 
regard to the use of water in the water-scarce MENA region, it can be said that while 
“water per capita consumption rates are the lowest in the world, municipal and 
industrial water requirements are expected to double and triple over the next years.”21 
However, although water demand is rising, the world is facing a crisis of effective water 
management rather than a crisis of scarcity per se.  With today’s knowledge, experience 
and technology, water problems are potentially manageable providing the resource is  
used and managed a lot more efficiently than in the past.22 However, securing safe and 
affordable water and sanitation services for all is still a major challenge to water 
governance in developing countries.  
Traditionally water and sanitation have been provided publicly. However, in 
many developing countries the public sector has proved incapable of overcoming 
ineffective and inefficient management systems, of introducing modern technologies 
and of providing sufficient investment. As a remedy to this challenge donors have over 
the past two decades promoted private sector participation. Private sector participation 
shall be defined here as including all arrangements between a public and a private 
partner that involve the latter in the delivery of infrastructural services.23 The possible 
forms of PSP range from the hybrid forms of a management contract, an affermage 
contract, a lease contract or a concession to fully private provision (divestiture) as the 
main alternatives (see Figure 1).24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 cf. Stockholm International Water Institute, 2002, p.9ff. 
21 Abu-Zeid, Mahmoud, 2003, p.115 
22 cf. See Biswas, Asit K.; Tortajada, Cecilia, 2005 
23 cf. World Bank, 2006a, p.xiii 
24 Further alternatives known as BOT, BOO, BOOT and others are available, but make no difference with regard to 
the causal mechanisms assumed in this research.  
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FIGURE 1: FORMS OF PSP  
Option Ownership of Financing 
infrastructure 
investment 
Operations 
operating assets infrastructure assets 
Management 
contract 
Contracting 
authority 
Contracting authority Contracting 
authority 
Private Operator  
(receives a fee) 
Affermage 
contract 
Private Operator Contracting authority Contracting 
authority 
Private Operator  
(retains a fee) 
Lease 
contract  
Private Operator Contracting authority Contracting 
authority 
Private Operator  
(pays a lease fee) 
Concession Private Operator Contracting authority Private Operator 
 
Private Operator  
(retains revenues, 
pays concession 
fee) 
Sale or full 
divestiture 
Private Operator Private Operator Private Operator 
 
Private Operator  
(retains revenues, 
pays license fee) 
Source: Merged and adapted from Prasad, Naren (2006), p.682 and World Bank (2006a), p.9 
 
 In the case of a management contract the responsibility for the management and 
operation of a utility is transferred to a private operator, but the ownership and the 
responsibility for investments remains public. The operator receives a fee of which a 
part is usually conditional on achieving performance targets.  In affermage and lease 
contracts, the contracting authority keeps the task of financing the investments, but the 
operator is responsible for operating and maintaining the business and therefore owns 
the operating assets. The options differ in the way that in affermages the operator retains 
a fee from the revenues that have been collected on behalf of the contracting authority, 
while the operator in case of a lease contract has to pay a lease fee from the collected 
revenues to the public authority. The concession is a form of a PSP where the operator, 
in addition to the responsibilities mentioned in the previous two options, is responsible 
for financing the investments but without owning the infrastructural assets. In this case, 
the operator retains the revenues in return for a concession fee. Finally, the divestiture is 
an arrangement where the operator is obliged to pay a license fee, but has the full 
responsibility for the business and owns the infrastructural assets.25 With the increase of 
responsibility and ownership transfer in the above mentioned arrangements, both the 
risk and potential profits for the operator increase.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 cf. World Bank, 2006a, p.7ff. 
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FIGURE 2: INVESTMENT COMMITMENT AND NUMBER OF PROJECTS 
 
Source: Marin, Philippe; Izaguirre, Ada Karina, 2006, p.2 
 
Recent trends show that governments and operators are shying away from 
arrangements involving major risks such as in a concession or divestiture. The share of 
management and lease contracts in PSP projects has risen from 19% in the second half 
of the 1990s to 24-25% in the years 2001-2005.26 Countries with no previous 
experience of PSP in the water sector tend to fall back upon arrangements where the 
private operator is in charge of increasing the operational efficiency of the utility, while 
the public authority remains responsible for financing the investments. The fact that 
developing countries have been able to obtain the necessary financing on better 
conditions from donors may have been a catalyzing factor in this trend.27 Thus, as 
Figure 2 above shows, while the amount of private investments in the water sector has 
declined in rexent years, the number of new contracts has gorwn.  This shows that 
neither governments nor private operators have turned away from PSP in general, but 
are rather concentrating on the managerial and operational competences of the private 
side while avoiding the risks that result from entering into long-term commitments with 
high risks.  
After two decades of private sector participation in water management, there is 
no conclusive proof regarding their efficiency as results have been mixed and empirical 
                                                 
26 cf. Marin, Philippe; Izaguirre, Ada Karina, 2006, p.3 
27 cf. Marin, Philippe; Izaguirre, Ada Karina, 2006, p.3 
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studies remain open to doubt. Although various case studies have revealed 
improvements in the sector following privatization, these studies often used samples 
that typically did not entail “enough variation either across countries or over time to 
find strong, statistically significant results”.28 Opponents of PSP have argued that the 
privatization of water supply and sanitation services has often been characterized by 
problems such as corruption, excess pricing, excess profits and low water quality; 
problems which are often associated with the replacement of public monopolies by 
private ones.29 For this reason and because of the political sensitivity of the water issue 
the debate on water privatization has become extremely polarized. Over time, “water 
has been conceptualized as a service, an economic good, a social good, an 
environmental need, a human right, and in many other ways”.30 However, too often pro- 
and anti-privatization proponents have ignored the new insights each of these concepts 
has brought, and advocated water either as a commodity or as a right. While water 
certainly can be considered as a social good, the reliable provision of safe water is a 
service “which costs money, energy and human resources”.31  
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW: APPROACHES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
This section provides a brief overview of some of the key research that has been 
undertaken on the determinants of the performance of private sector participation in 
infrastructure provision.  Much of the literature on PSPs has hitherto concentrated on  
large-scale projects with high private investments, leaving small-scale projects and 
PSPs of a management or lease contract type relatively neglected.32 The author regards 
this as an inappropriate narrowing of the view on PSP, especially as the recent 
development shows that the share of low-risk options is rising.33  
The literature review is structured according to the level of analysis on which the 
determining factors (that the authors put forward) can be located. The definition of 
levels is borrowed from a later work of Oliver Williamson.34 Williamson identifies four 
levels for the analysis of transactions: (1) the level of institutional embeddedness, (2)  
                                                 
28 Clarke, George R.G.; Kosec, Katrina; Wallsten, Scott, 2004, p.4 
29 cf. Lobina, Emanuele; Hall, David, 2000, p.36 
30 Carter, Richard .C.; Danert, Kerstin 2003, p.1070 
31 Carter, Richard C.; Danert, Kerstin 2003, p.1071 
32 cf. Budds, Jessica 2000, p.55 
33 cf. Marin, Philippe.; Izaguirre, Ada Karina 2006, p.3 
34 cf. Williamson, Oliver, 2000, p. 597 
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the level of the institutional environment, (3) the level of governance, and (4) the level 
of resource allocation and employment (see Figure 3). Levels 1 and 4 will be covered 
fairly briefly and largely for completeness, while the main focus of this review is on the 
two middle levels. The levels will be listed in reverse order, starting with the fourth 
level. 
 
FIGURE 3: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Level Focus Purpose Broader Theory 
Level 1 Embeddedness: informal 
institutions, customs, traditions, 
norms, religion 
Often non-calculative; 
spontaneous 
 
Draws from social 
theory 
Level 2 Institutional environment: formal 
rules of the game – esp. property 
(polity, judiciary, bureaucracy) 
Get the institutional 
environment right. 
 
Draws from the 
economics of property 
rights/positive political 
theory 
 
Level 3 Governance: especially of . 
contracts (aligning governance 
structures with transactions) 
Get the governance 
structures right. 
 
 Draws from transaction 
cost economics 
 
Level 4 Resource allocation and 
employment  
(prices and quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
 
Get the marginal 
conditions right. 
 
Draws from 
neoclassical 
economics/agency 
theory 
 
Source: Adapted from Williamson, Oliver, 2000, p. 597 
2.3.1 Level of Resource Allocation and Employment 
The fourth level draws from the fields of neoclassical economics as well as the 
agency theory. Neoclassical economists are mainly concerned with prices and quantities 
as they find that an optimal resource allocation is automatically created through 
competition in the market. Such findings are based on the assumption of perfect 
competition. However, the provision of infrastructure services, in particular water and 
sanitation, entails natural monopoly characteristics.35 A mere reliance on price 
mechanisms and competition would therefore be inadequate and inappropriate for 
infrastructure services. Proper price setting mechanisms may therefore only be 
considered as one of the building blocks that affect the performance of PSP 
                                                 
35 A natural monopoly occurs where the fixed costs for entering the market are very high. The high investments that 
are necessary especially for piped distribution systems make it uneconomic for a second supplier to enter the market. 
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arrangements.  Agency theory, on the other hand, emphasises the alignment of 
incentives and an efficient sharing of risks between the contracting parties before the 
signing of a contract (ex-ante).36 Thus, this theory could help to explain failures of PSPs 
to deliver when there are deficiencies in the contract, in particular with respect to the 
incentive schemes. Better contractual conditions could hence avoid a future failure.  
2.3.2 Level of Governance 
In contrast to the foregoing approach, transaction cost economics (which forms 
part of the field of new institutional economics) focuses on the governance of 
contractual relations. A pioneer of the transaction cost approach is Oliver Williamson. 
His particular interest was to explain why specific transactions governed by specific 
institutional arrangements are undertaken more or less efficiently. As the new 
institutional economic approach helps to form the basis for the theoretical framework of 
this study, it will be discussed more comprehensively than the presvious approach.  
Williamson’s main argument is that the level of transaction costs is directly 
related to the degree of (mis)fit between transaction characteristics and the chosen 
governance structure (e.g. contract type). He discerns three dimensions for 
characterizing transactions: uncertainty, frequency and idiosyncrasy. Uncertainty refers 
to the unknown circumstances that will prevail during a contract’s implementation. As 
the rationality of human beings is bounded, it can become necessary to adapt the 
contract, which involves costs for renegotiation and modification. With regard to the 
frequency dimension, three types can be identified: one-time, occasional and recurrent 
transactions. This dimension affects costs, because recurrent transactions over a long 
time require other enforcement mechanisms than occasional transactions. Finally, the 
last dimension classifies investments into non-specific, mixed and idiosyncratic ones. 
With an increasing degree of idiosyncrasy (i.e. the more specific the investments are), 
the supplier’s capability to transfer investments to other locations or purposes without 
considerable loss of value decreases. Thus, the supplier is “‘locked into’ the transaction 
to a significant degree”.37 The lock-in effect describes a situation where sunk costs 
induce the supplier to continue supplying even when the business is uneconomic in the 
short term in order to prevent the loss of the investments. If the buyer is aware of this 
                                                 
36 cf. Williamson, Oliver, 2000, p. 600 
37 Williamson, Oliver, 1979, p.240 
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lock-in, the danger of the buyer’s opportunism grows.38 The transaction costs that can 
be associated with this feature are the costs for preventing the buyer from opportunism 
and the costs that arise from enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the supplier makes 
the agreed-upon investments.  
To make the transaction efficient, the level of (especially ex-post) costs has to be 
kept low. According to Williamson, transaction cost efficiency can be achieved through 
the right choice and design of a governance structure. Governance structures are 
“arrangements [e.g. contracts] between economic units that govern the way they 
cooperate and/or compete”.39 Williamson distinguishes three main types of 
arrangements available for the governing of transactions: markets, hierarchies, and 
hybrids. A market transaction is the simplest and most flexible governance structure 
because ex-ante contracting costs are low and no specific enforcement mechanisms 
have to be established. This is mainly because competition protects each party against 
opportunism of the other party. The flexibility of the arrangement makes it especially 
suitable for transactions with a high degree of uncertainty, but a market is only 
appropriate for non-specific investments of all frequencies. If more specific goods or 
services are involved, possible market alternatives decrease and room for opportunism 
emerges.40 In the case of a hierarchy a single authority decides upon the use of assets 
and bears all risks. The transaction is vertically integrated into the firm or any other 
entity, thereby securing a high commitment and minimizing the danger of opportunism. 
But due to a lack of competition, internal organization tends to be short of incentives for 
cost reductions and productivity enhancements. Thus, a hierarchy is only appropriate, if 
the transaction is highly idiosyncratic and uncertain. Finally, hybrids are those kinds of 
contractual frameworks, for which various possibilities exist in which way the 
ownership of assets, the risks and decision-making rights can be distributed between the 
parties and for which a variety of mechanisms can be established to protect from 
opportunism. In general, Williamson recommends them for transactions with mixed 
investment characteristics of a recurrent type and idiosyncratic investments of an 
occasional type. However, for the special case of the regulation of a natural monopoly, 
such as water supply, which demands highly idiosyncratic investments, he argues that,  
                                                 
38 For a definition and explanation of the term ‘opportunism’ see chapter 4.1. 
39 Huet, Freddy; Saussier, Stéphane, 2003, p.413 
40 cf. Williamson, Oliver, 1979, p.253 
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if efficiency concerns “necessarily join buyers and sellers in a bilateral trading relation 
of a continuing nature”, then a specialized governance structure, namely a hybrid, is the 
appropriate governance structure.41 
The preceding explanation of Williamson’s approach has pointed out that the 
degree of a (mis)fit between the characteristics of a transaction and its chosen 
governance structure determines the transaction costs. This hypothesis is empirically 
supported by a research by Ménard and Saussier (2002) who have applied the 
transaction cost approach in their examination of contractual choice and performance in 
the water supply in France.42 They were able to econometrically test the assumptions 
underlying the approach and what they found is what the theory suggests.  If the mode 
of governance is chosen in accordance with what the transaction situation requires, then 
the performance of this arrangement is similar or better than the performance of 
arrangements working in comparable conditions but under a different mode of 
governance. The performance was relatively good when a transaction characterized by a 
high uncertainty and specificity of investments was governed by an integrated 
arrangement,43 i.e. public provision or a management contract. Empirical results further 
showed that whenever the transaction is less uncertain and investments are less specific, 
a concession is an advisable PSP arrangement. From their findings Ménard and Saussier 
conclude that there is no absolute advantage for one specific governance mode, but 
“comparative advantages that depend crucially on the characteristics of the transactions 
that modes of governance organize”.44 Getting the governance structure right is 
therefore one key determinant of the performance of a transaction (such as a PSP 
arrangement), whereas performance is used here in the sense of transaction cost 
efficiency.  
2.3.3 Level of the Institutional Environment 
When we move to the second level we may distinguish between approaches that 
originate from political economy or public choice theory on the one hand and new 
institutional economics (NIE) theories on the other hand. The NIE approaches of the 
second level differ from the transaction cost economics on the third level (which are 
                                                 
41 Williamson, Oliver, 1979, p.258 
42 cf. Ménard, Claude ; Saussier, Stéphane, 2002, p.8 
43 cf. Ménard, Claude ; Saussier, Stéphane, 2002, p.25 
44 Ménard, Claude; Saussier, Stéphane, 2002, p.27 
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also part of the NIE) in the sense that they are concerned with the rules of the game, and 
not with the play of the game.45 
The case study by Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken (2006) about the 
characteristics of well performing water utilities identifies political factors as the main 
determinants of success and can therefore be assigned to the first category. Their study 
examines public water utilities, but the identified key attributes of well-performing 
public utilities are also regarded as valid for private utilities.46 The findings of the case 
study show a link between the performance of the utilities and the way they are 
connected with their environment: Well performing utilities are boasting a significant 
degree of autonomy and an accountability framework that is capable of maintaining an 
equilibrium between the various stakeholders (national government, municipal officials, 
community leaders, financing institutions and customers).47 In contrast, poorly 
functioning utilities showed a low autonomy and distorting influences from the various 
stakeholders. Their conclusion is therefore that a utility’s autonomy combined with 
balanced accountabilities to a variety of stakeholders (including customers) prevents 
politicians and others from pursuing their short-term political interests by arbitrarily 
interfering into the utility, thus fulfilling an important condition for good performance.  
Another view is taken by Rufin and Romero (2003) in their study of the 
sustainability of regulatory reforms in Latin America.  They find that the independence 
of a regulatory entity is a crucial criterion to both secure commitment from the public 
side and to prevent capture from the private side. The possibility of a capture of 
regulatory entities by the regulated companies depends on the resources and capabilities 
available to regulators. The danger of a lack of commitment of the public side on the 
other hand lies within what they call “time inconsistency in public policy”, i.e. the 
pursuing of policies that are inconsistent with past ones.48 They find this phenomenon 
especially prevalent in infrastructure services because of their vulnerability to 
patronage. The danger of appropriation becomes likely, which is the “‘gradual erosion’ 
of private property rights”.49 But in the case that regulatory independence has been 
established, its sustainability depends on structural features that determine the actors’ 
                                                 
45 cf. Williamson, Oliver, 2000, p. 599 
46 cf. World Bank, 2006b, p.2 
47 Baietti, Aldo; Kingdom, William; van Ginneken, Meike, 2006, p.10ff. 
48 Rufin, Carlos; Romero, Evanán, 2003, p.1 
49 Rufin, Carlos; Romero, Evanán, 2003, p.3 
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ability to commit. Stability-providing constitutions, effective legislative and judicial 
supervision, high competence, participation and transparency are features that make the 
reversal of regulatory independence more difficult. In summary, Rufin and Romero 
identify in their analysis a mix of political and institutional factors as determinants of 
the likelihood of appropriation and capture which again affect the performance of a 
utility. 
This brings us to the NIE approaches of the second level which concentrate on 
institutional factors. Saleth and Dinar (2004) have developed a framework to identify 
those institutions, institutional linkages and external influences that may have an impact 
on water sector performance.50 They distinguish between water institutions and 
exogenous or contextual influences. The water institutions are composed of the water 
law (water rights, scope for private participation etc.), the water policy (use priority, 
project selection etc.), and the water organization (structure of water administration, 
finance patterns etc.). The environment which may have an influence on the water 
institutions or directly on the water sector performance  is characterized by the political 
system, the legal system, the demography, the economic development and policies as 
well as the resources environment. Institutions affect water sector performance by their 
effects on the transaction costs, since they are able to minimize uncertainty and thus 
facilitate exchange.51 Regarding the factors exogenous to the water sector Saleth and 
Dinar find that they “represent the exogenous constraints and opportunities facing the 
water sector” and thus shape the interaction between institutions and water sector 
performance.52 
Another approach on the second level which emphasizes the institutional 
environment is the one by Levy and Spiller (1994) in their study of PSPs in the 
telecommunication sector.53 While Ménard and Saussier have narrowly applied the 
generic form of the transaction cost approach, Levy and Spiller (1994) have augmented 
it with macro-institutional factors, namely political and judicial institutions, and tested 
the validity of this framework in a comparative analysis of privatized 
telecommunications regulation. Their objective was to verify if the institutional 
environment in a country affects the regulatory commitment of the government and if 
                                                 
50 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2005, p. 3 
51 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2004, p. 35 
52 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2004, p. 105 
53 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, pp.201-246 
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this has an influence on the sector’s economic performance. The results of their 
empirical examination show that if a country lacks the necessary institutional 
environment that substantiates commitment and if this lack is not absorbed by a 
regulatory system that is correspondingly designed, the performance of the private 
operator will be weak.  Holburn and Spiller (2002) have made use of the same 
theoretical framework and applied it to international electricity sector reforms.54 Their 
findings confirm Levy and Spiller’s assumptions since they also identify institutional 
provisions, particularly a credible regulatory environment, as major conditions for the 
success of private sector participation. We will come back to this approach later and 
will now continue with a short reference to Williamson’s last level of social analysis. 
2.3.4 Level of Institutional Embeddedness 
The level of institutional embeddedness refers to informal institutions such as 
customs, norms, tradition and religion.  Analysis of this level has been undertaken by 
economic historians and other social scientists.55 As each higher level imposes 
constraints on the level immediately below, the level of embeddedness also restrains the 
possible efforts to get the institutional environment right. However, informal institutions 
themselves can hardly be shaped deliberately, but usually develop in a non-calculative 
and spontaneous way. Therefore Level 1 is often taken as given. 
The preceding survey of the literature shows that the research on the 
determinants of the performance of private operators in public infrastructure projects 
has been carried out on different levels. Many enquiries have been devoted to the level 
of resource allocation and employment.  However, neoclassical economics have largely 
failed to explain the experienced malfunctions of PSP arrangements and the basic 
assumptions of the theory have been widely challenged by the new institutional 
economics (NIE) theories. Therefore, this level has been traced here only marginally. 
With respect to NIE theories much of the research has focused on regulation as a 
contracting problem and has therefore concentrated on investigating the adequate 
allocation of property rights, the definition of incentive and enforcement schemes and 
the fitting of the contractual terms with the transaction characteristics.   
                                                 
54 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, pp.1-40 
55 cf. Williamson, Oliver, 2000, p. 596 
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However, current development debates indicate that a country’s broader 
governance system is increasingly recognized as a vital requirement for development.  
The present study therefore aims at closing a gap in research by providing a systematic 
application of a framework, which aims at identifying in which way institutions (and 
not the contract design as such) affect the performance of private sector participation in 
the water sector. Thus, it will take into account the specific characteristics of the water 
sector, as it is assumed that the characteristics of other infrastructure services (such as 
telecommunication and electricity) will not allow a one-to-one transfer of the 
conclusions of existing research in these fields. The conceptual framework will be 
adapted to be applicable to all types of private sector participation, thereby 
compensating for the bias in literature towards large-scale and high-risk investments.  
The following section further develops the theoretical framework for this study, 
in particular by discussing the concept of institutions; outlining the framework 
developed by Levy and Spiller, on which the present study relies quite heavily; and 
identifying a number of amendments and extensions to Levy and Spiller’s approach for 
the purposes of the present research. 
 
2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.4.1 The Concept of Institutions 
Institutional economists define institutions as “humanly devised constraints that 
structure human interaction”56 or as “rules that together describe action situations, 
delineate action sets, provide incentives and determine outcomes”.57  In other words, the 
notion of an institution contains several elements.  Behavioural rules may be formal 
(e.g. laws, constitutions) or informal (e.g. norms of behaviour, conventions, self-
imposed codes of conduct).58 In any case, these rules constrain or encourage a certain 
human behaviour. This applies because institutions entail mechanisms that enforce these 
rules, either through incentives or through enforcement mechanisms. Here, one can 
distinguish between private and state enforcement. While the former means the 
                                                 
56 North, Douglass, C., 1994, p.360 
57 Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2005, p.2 
58 cf. North, Douglass, C., 1994, p. 360 
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enforcement of customs, norms and conventions through society, or of formal private 
rules through organized private monitoring, the latter is the organized enforcement of 
positive law by the state.  The notion of institutions that will be used in this study is 
wider than the notion of organisations.  Organisations are the bodies or activity systems 
which include concrete individuals and which are governed by institutional 
arrangements. 
Now that these terms have been clarified, it is necessary to look into the different 
categories of institutions. One can identify judicial institutions that regulate legal 
interactions through the definition and enforcement of rights and duties. Another 
category are political institutions, which govern political interactions, for example 
constitutions, electoral rules and federalism. Economic institutions influence or 
determine economic interactions, by means of markets, contracts, allocation of 
ownership etc. Finally, social institutions regulate social interactions, such as informal 
norms, but also formal rules such as gender quotas. 
Institutions affect interactions by constraining and encouraging a certain human 
behaviour through incentives and disincentives. Acting according to the rules of the 
game rewards the players or at least does not lead to their punishment. However, acting 
against the rules results in sanctions and is therefore costly, provided that the 
institutions are properly enforced. By shaping the incentives of the actors, institutions 
increase the information level of the players about the strategies that are available for 
their counterparts and about their related costs and benefits for them. For example, an 
administrative actor will not exceed his/her competences, if the consequences for 
him/her are costly. In this example, this may be the case if the water sector is properly 
juridificated and the administrative actor can expect to be held responsible for 
misconduct. Being aware of the constraints on the behaviour of the administrative actor, 
his/her counterpart possesses information on the likelihood of the different strategies 
available to him/her. Thus, institutions are able to decrease uncertainty. The ability to 
forecast the strategic behaviour of the players to some extent reduces risk and 
consequently facilitates exchange.59 
Institutions are also related to the costs of transactions. A transaction can be 
defined as a transfer of a good or service “across a technologically separable 
                                                 
59 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2004, p.35 
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interface”.60 The terms of a transaction may be specified in a contract between the 
transaction partners. In economic terms, a contract can be defined as an agreement 
under which at least two contracting parties “make reciprocal commitments in terms of 
their behaviour”.61 When setting up a contract ex-ante costs for information, 
negotiation, writing, and ex-post costs for monitoring and enforcing arise. If the contract 
also entails the combination of resources, further costs are added such as organization, 
ongoing communication, reporting etc. With the preciseness of the contract also the 
costs of the transaction rise. Nonetheless, even if high contracting costs are computed, 
contracts are necessarily incomplete, because the rationality of all players is bounded.  
When the institutional framework insufficiently constrains the discretion of the 
actors in a transaction (e.g. through incomplete contracts, lacking regulation or 
ineffective enforcement), opportunistic behaviour may arise, which is defined here as 
the pursuit of self-interests by one or both of the transaction partners.62 This includes all 
breaches or disregards of the contract, pressure for its renegotiation or manoeuvres of 
manipulation and deception. Even though a highly precise contract might discourage 
opportunism to a major extent, opting for precision is not a solution to the problem of 
opportunism. The reason is that it makes the transaction inflexible and that with the 
precision of the contract the costs of contracting rise.63 While the set up of institutions 
(such as contract law) creates costs, institutions are also able to reduce transaction costs 
by limiting the discretion of the actors, which again decreases the need for precise 
contracts, large-scale monitoring and detailed enforcement mechanisms. 
The argumentation above has shown that the institutional environment affects 
the contractual performance of the transaction partners (i.e. their behaviour within the 
transaction) by limiting their discretion. An inappropriate alignment of institutions is 
likely to have unintended outcomes. The same applies in the case of an insufficient 
enforcement of institutions, i.e. if actors expect that sanctions will not be imposed even 
if rules are broken. However, the proper design of institutions may contribute to bring 
about a good performance, in terms of contractual performance and consequently also 
the effectiveness of the contract (i.e. achieving contractual targets). This means that 
                                                 
60 Williamson, Oliver, 1981, p.552 
61 Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Michel, 2001, p.2 
62 cf. Durth, Rainer; Körner, Heiko; Michaelowa, Katharina, 2002, p.214. [Translated by the author] 
63 cf. Saleth, Maria R.; Dinar, Ariel, 2004, p.99 
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institutional frameworks can be more or less developed, i.e. more or less effective in 
helping to bring about desired outcomes. Due to this link between the institutional 
framework and the effectiveness of the contract, this study assesses the success of a PSP 
in terms of the effectiveness of the contract. Naturally, an effectively implemented 
contract is not necessarily successful in developmental terms, if the increase of 
efficiency and welfare is not among its objectives. But neither is a contract a success in 
developmental terms merely for the reason that it aims at the increase of efficiency and 
welfare. To be a success in these terms it first needs to be effectively implemented.   
2.4.2 Theoretical Framework Developed by Levy and Spiller 
The theoretical framework by Levy and Spiller is rooted in transaction cost 
economics, but it supplements the transaction cost approach by adding the institutional 
environment as an exogenous variable. The specific objective of their study of PSPs in 
the telecommunications sector is to show how political and judicial institutions affect 
regulatory processes by abating and amplifying the potential for administrative 
expropriation or manipulation, thereby  affecting the performance of a privately 
operated water utility.64 They define political institutions as those formal mechanisms 
that establish how laws and regulations are made and how the members of the 
legislative and the executive are appointed, how these laws are implemented, and what 
the nature of the relation between the executive and the legislative is. Judicial 
institutions are defined as those formal rules that determine the internal structure of the 
judiciary and the mechanisms for appointing judges, as well as the resolution 
mechanism for conflicts among private parties or state-private party conflicts.65  
Before explaining which effects these institutions may have, it makes sense to 
trace the linkage between the terms used by Levy and Spiller and those by Williamson. 
Williamson defines the governance structure of a transaction as an “institutional matrix 
within which transactions are negotiated and executed”.66 Although with this definition 
he mainly refers to contractual institutions, which regulate the behaviour of the parties, 
the concept can easily be expanded at this point. Levy and Spiller distinguish two 
notions: the regulatory governance framework and the regulatory incentives. The 
regulatory incentives are those rules (institutions) that constrain the monopoly 
                                                 
64 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.202 
65 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.205f 
66 Williamson, Oliver, 1979, p.239 
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behavioural tendencies of utilities, such as pricing, subsidies, and assignment of risks 
and rewards.67 The regulatory governance framework comprises the mechanisms that 
constrain regulatory discretion of political and administrative actors who have the final 
authority over the sector. Furthermore, it includes the rules that resolve conflicts, which 
come up in relation to these constraints.68 Levy and Spiller argue that most of the 
literature dealing with regulation has been preoccupied with what falls under the 
regulatory incentives, and that this focus is inadequate. They state that regulatory 
incentives indeed matter for performance, but that “their impact (positive or negative) 
comes to the forefront only if regulatory governance has successfully been put in 
place”.69 One example is that incentives for an operator to invest are only effective if the 
operator does not need to fear that his investments – once they are made – are devalued 
by the opportunistic actions of the regulator. This problem is known to Williamson as a 
hold-up problem. To fill the gap in the literature, Levy and Spiller concentrate on the 
regulatory governance of transactions and the institutional environment in which it is 
embedded.   
Levy and Spiller find that political and judicial institutions affect the regulatory 
processes between regulator and operator in two ways: on the one hand by influencing 
the potential for manipulation and expropriation by political and administrative actors; 
and on the other hand by determining which PSP options are most suitable.  The latter 
is important, as long-term complex contracts that transfer more responsibility to the 
private party require more effective regulation and supervision than short-term and 
simpler contracts that transfer less responsibility. However, this study will concentrate 
on the first aspect of institutions and come back to the second one in the final chapter 
when concluding on the role that the institutional framework played in the case study.  
When looking at the regulatory problem it becomes clear that the special 
transaction features of utilities intensify the danger of arbitrary political and 
administrative action. First, public infrastructure is characterized by large sunk 
investments (or idiosyncrasy).  This means that a private operator that has assumed the 
responsibility for such investments (for example, concessions) is locked into the 
                                                 
67 cf. Figure 1, Level 4 
68 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.8 
69 Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.205 
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transaction to a considerable extent. Second, the potential for economies of scale70 entail 
monopoly characteristics. And third, the fact that utility services are massively 
consumed creates the attention of politicians and interest groups towards the level of 
utility pricing and service quality.71 These three features, sunk investments, monopoly 
characteristics, and massive consumption, provide governments with an opportunity and 
incentive to expropriate an operator’s sunk assets or to manipulate the regulatory 
regime.  
However to do so, governments do not need to re-nationalise a utility, but can 
gradually usurp the assets of a private operator and manipulate the contractual 
conditions through regulatory procedures and administrative measures. This is 
profitable for a government if “the direct costs (reputation loss vis-à-vis other utilities, 
lack of future investments by utilities) are small compared to the (short term) benefits of 
such action (achieving re-election by reducing utilities' prices, by challenging the 
monopoly, etc.), and if the indirect institutional costs (e.g. disregarding the judiciary, 
not following the proper, or traditional, administrative procedures, etc.) are not too 
large”.72 From this it can be concluded that the likelihood of arbitrary action from 
political and administrative actors is the highest in those countries where the indirect 
institutional costs and the direct costs are small and the time horizon of the government 
is short. The indirect institutional costs are determined by the political and judicial 
institutions. If the checks and balances on decision-making are marginal, if the 
administration has strong regulatory power, and if the judiciary is not independent 
enough to review administrative decisions, then the regulatory discretion of political 
and administrative actors is large. If, moreover, the elections take a highly contested 
form and there is a strong need of political actors to satisfy interest groups, then the 
incentive to use this regulatory discretion rises and opportunism becomes more likely.73  
Levy and Spiller conclude from this (with a bias towards PSPs of a 
concessionary or similar type) that under such circumstances, uncertainty is a major 
factor for private companies, which may result in under-investment. A utility might still 
invest, but it will only do so in fields where a high market return is combined with a 
                                                 
70 Economies of scale are present when an increase of input factors (e.g. by 100%) leads to an even higher increase of 
output (more than 100%). This typically leads to a reduction of suppliers in the market. 
71 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.3 
72 Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.4 
73 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.4 
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short payback period. Furthermore, it will tend to limit its maintenance expenditures, 
which may well lead to a decreasing quality of the infrastructure. In addition, the 
technologies used will tend to have a lower degree of specificity, as they entail lower 
costs and can be transferred to other uses. Finally, a short payback-period may be 
realized through high service prices.74 To attract sustainable long-term investments the 
government will therefore have to design regulatory frameworks which limit its own 
ability for opportunism that is given by the institutional environment. Such institutional 
arrangements can for instance prescribe price-setting procedures or specify that  
conflicts must be solved through an arbitrator or the judiciary. However, specialized 
governance structures entail costs and the types of regulations that are credible within a 
detrimental institutional environment are limited.75  
Hence, to allow for efficient regulation and satisfactory performance of private 
operators three complementary mechanisms restraining arbitrary administrative action 
need to be in place: (a) substantive restraints on regulatory discretion, (b) formal or 
informal restraints on changing the regulatory system, and (c) institutions that enforce 
both the substantive restraints and restraints on system changes.76 To remain within the 
logic of the levels that were introduced in the literature review, we will start backwards: 
Mechanism (c): The basic precondition for a government to show that it credibly 
refrains from expropriation and manipulative administrative action is the existence of an 
independent judiciary. This guarantees that restraints on discretion and restraints on 
system changes will be enforced. It is unlikely that countries where the judiciary is not 
independent, will be capable of sustaining efficient private sector participation and 
investments. Yet, if in such a case, the government still prefers a PSP to a vertically 
integrated public supply, then international guarantees might secure enough 
commitment to attract some private investment.  
Mechanism (b): Institutional restraints on changing the regulatory system can be 
promoted in a variety of ways. Levy and Spiller distinguish two main categories: (i) 
systems that can provide credible regulatory commitment via legislation, and (ii) 
systems in which political actors need to show commitment by basing the regulatory 
process in contract law. The former category (i) in the broadest sense includes political 
                                                 
74 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.5 
75 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.202 
76 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, pp.209-211 
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systems with separated executive and legislative powers, multi-chamber legislatures 
elected non-simultaneously under different voting rules, federalism with strong 
decentralization, and proportional representation which tends to generate a large number 
of parties. If a number or all of these features characterize a political system, its 
legislation becomes more credible, since they make a change of legislation more 
difficult as a variety of contending actors would need to agree to such changes (checks 
and balances). The regulatory decision-making procedures of these systems may 
therefore be specified in administrative law. However, a political system with 
overlapping executive and legislative powers, one-chamber legislatures, strong 
centralization as well as majority vote systems (category ii) involve the danger for the 
private contracting party that legislation is easily adjusted, when priorities of a 
government change or the ruling party/parties change. In other words, in countries 
where the governmental power alternates between two parties with substantially 
different interests, changes in the law could follow directly from a change of the 
government or a change in priorities and therefore specific legislation does not represent 
a realistic protection against arbitrary administrative action. However, commitment can 
be shown by stipulating the regulatory process in contract law. 
Mechanism (a): Substantive restraints on regulatory discretion can again be 
classified into two categories.  The first is where the institutional environment includes 
informal constraints or bodies of administrative law that constrain arbitrary discretion 
even in the absence of explicit legal constraints, or if the arbitrary use of governmental 
power is limited by an institutionalized process of argumentation and consensus 
formation.  In such cases, flexible regulatory processes may well be sufficient to restrain 
regulatory discretion. Second, if the discretion is not constrained by informal, 
administrative or process regulation, a country has to set substantive rules. However,  
the ability to set, monitor and enforce complex rules depends on its administrative 
capabilities. If these are weak, the country has to rely on less efficient rules for their 
regulatory system to work.  
The preceding remarks show that good governance and legal certainty are 
critical dimensions considered by companies before making their investments. 
However, a government can use a variety of available mechanisms to show commitment 
– as one mechanism may compensate for the shortage of another – though at different 
costs and levels of efficiency. Moreover, as Levy and Spiller point out, credibility 
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sometimes is attained at the expense of flexibility. The same devices that constrain 
arbitrary discretion can also delay reforms or obstruct adaptations to changing 
circumstances.77  
The following section will present the amendments to Levy and Spiller’s 
approach that were found to be essential for a comprehensive evaluation of the impact 
of institutional frameworks on PSP in the water sector in Jordan. 
2.4.3 Amendments to the Framework and Application to the Water Sector 
The preceding summary of Levy and Spiller’s approach has shown that their 
theory only deals with explaining contractual distortions initiated by the government 
and not by the private contracting partner. In the author’s eyes this is an inadequate 
narrowing of the view on the effects of institutions on a PSP arrangement. The same 
institutions that may constrain the discretion of the public contracting party may also 
have an impact on the discretion of the private contracting party. Well-defined and 
efficient regulatory processes are likely to reduce the potential for opportunism by the 
private operator. An independent judiciary, a tradition of upholding contracts, effective 
penalization and administrative capabilities that allow for complex rules are effective 
enforcement mechanisms which increase the potential costs of an operator for 
manipulating or exploiting a contract and thus make opportunistic behaviour less 
advantageous. This again affects the incentives of the operator to fulfil contractual goals 
and targets and thus has an impact on the effectiveness of the contract. Therefore, in this 
study the effects of institutions on both parties will be taken into account. 
Furthermore, the approach by Levy and Spiller will be enlarged by another 
important element that is lacking within their framework. Their concept of institutional 
environment includes only national institutions. However, international institutions may 
also have a direct impact on the regulatory discretion of political and administrative 
actors, in particular in cases where PSPs are supported through international loans or 
development assistance.  In such cases, international institutions can “support contracts 
and partially substitute for weak domestic institutions”.78 They may do so by making 
opportunistic behaviour costly for political and administrative actors, as the exploitation 
of a private operator will presumably lead to a considerable decrease in future 
                                                 
77 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.207 
78 Shirley, Mary M.; Ménard, Claude, 2002, p.24 
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development assistance or private investment. This reduces the incentives for 
opportunistic behaviour where no national institutions restrain arbitrary action and thus 
improves contractual performance. Therefore, international institutions will be 
considered along with national political, judicial and regulatory institutions.  
Another criticism of Levy and Spiller’s approach concerns the fact that their  
notion of private sector participation is preconceived by them as arrangements with 
significant risks and major transfers of responsibilities. However, by definition the term 
private sector participation includes also minor-risk arrangements such as management 
and affermage contracts. Where no significant infrastructure investments are involved, 
an opportunistic public contracting party still has the possibility to manipulate or exploit 
the contract. This is because in any arrangement the private partner has made ex-ante 
‘investments’ in terms of informing, bargaining and setting up a business in that 
country. Moreover, the operator has invested in its reputation and may fear that its 
reputation may be harmed when conflicts with the government arise or the contract is 
unsuccessful. A company’s reputation is of even greater importance in the water sector, 
which is highly visible and where private sector participation is widely challenged. 
Thus, the private operator in a management or affermage contract is also ‘locked in’ to 
the transaction, yet to a lower degree than in, for example, a concession, where the 
operator has a high material risk.  Instead of Levy and Spiller’s notion of 
‘expropriation’ by the public partner, which is limited to infrastructure investments, the 
author will use the term ‘exploitation’, which may include any form of arbitrary action 
that takes advantage of the private operator’s situation and is to its detriment. However, 
when there is no possibility to expropriate an operator’s assets, it is necessary to outline 
which incentives political and administrative actors may still have to manipulate or 
exploit a contract. One may be to provide their clientele with advantages. Another is the 
fact that a reduction in staff that may well result from PSP is likely to meet with 
bureaucratic resistance, which again might lead to opportunistic action. However, 
according to Levy and Spiller’s theory, the room for opportunism may be constrained 
by the institutional framework, namely rule of law, political checks and balances and a 
clear and balanced regulatory framework.  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge some important differences between the 
water sector and the sectors covered by Levy and Spiller (telecommunications) and 
authors such as Holburn and Spiller (electricity) that have applied a similar 
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approach.have later applied the same approach to electricity sector reforms. However, 
what distinguishes these two utility services from water services are the specific 
characteristics of water, which are relevant for the transaction situation. What all kind of 
utilities have in common is that they may entail large sunk investments, economies of 
scale, and a massive consumption.79 Economies of scale imply that the profitability for 
other companies to compete with a supplier is limited. This is especially true for natural 
monopolies where the fixed costs for entering the market are very high.80 Nevertheless, 
several countries have managed to introduce competition into their electricity or 
telecommunication sector. However, with regard to water, 66% of costs are considered 
to be in non-competitive areas, such as transmission and distribution, and only about 
34% in potentially competitive areas, as compared to competitive areas amounting to 
60% of costs in electricity.81 Furthermore, water cannot be generated unlike electricity 
for example because it is a natural resource. A country’s underground and surface water 
resources are rather local and though often regarded as a renewable resource this is not 
always the case82. This becomes especially evident in cases where the extraction rate is 
higher than the replenishment rate. The latter is of special importance, as diminishing 
resources in many countries go along with a demographic development, which in the 
future might bring about water conflicts. Moreover, water is such an urgent basic human 
need – crucial for life and health – that one may consider it as a human right.83 The 
human need for water explains the inelasticity of demand, which is essential when 
concerning pricing.84 Water is also a merit good as it entails significant positive 
externalities85 as already outlined before.86 
These stronger monopoly characteristics, the potential for conflict, the 
limitedness of the resource, the inelasticity of demand, and its features as a human right 
and a merit good have a strong impact on the transaction situation. This is because the 
idiosyncrasy of the good, the uncertainty of the sector and the strong interest of the 
consumers – at the same time being voters – in the quality of the supply and the pricing 
maximise the incentives and the opportunity of politicians for arbitrary interference into 
                                                 
79 cf. Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p.3 
80 cf. Soto-Vazquez, Abdelali, 2006, p.6 
81 cf. London Economics, 1998, drawn from Shirley, Mary, M.; Ménard, Claude, 2002, p.9 
82 cf. Noll, Roger G., 2002, p.45 
83 cf. Klawitter, Simone; Qazzaz, Hadeel, 2005, pp.253-271 
84 cf. See Holburn, Guy L.F.; Spiller, Pablo T., 2002, p. 15 
85 cf. Lepenies, Philipp; Bauer, Armin, 2006 
86 cf. Chapter 2.2 
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Intermediary Variable 
 
 
Regulatory regime/ 
Transaction situation 
 
 
 
Incentives and potential of 
political/ administrative 
actors and the private 
operator to manipulate or 
exploit a PSP contract 
 
Independent Variable 
 
Institutional 
environment 
 
 
Judicial, political, 
international and 
regulatory institutions 
Dependent Variable 
 
Performance of a 
privately operated 
water utility 
 
 
Operator’s success/ 
failure to fulfil obligations 
and to attain goals and 
targets set in the contract 
 
the business. This finding is valid in comparison with other sectors, while the strength 
of incentives within the water sector again varies with the chosen PSP option. The 
following section will introduce the hypothesis and sub-hypotheses that can be derived 
from the theoretical framework and the outlined amendments to it.  
2.5 THEORETICALLY DERIVED HYPOTHESIS AND SUB-HYPOTHESES 
The aim of this study is to look at the problem of water utilities regulation 
through the lens of transaction cost economics, supplemented by the exogenous variable 
of the institutional environment of a transaction. The performance of a privately 
operated water utility will be explained through the contractual problems that arise from 
the potential and incentives of the public and private contracting party for opportunistic 
behaviour. Therefore, the hypothesis derived from the theoretical framework to be 
tested in the case study is the following:  
General Hypothesis: If the potential of political and administrative actors as 
well as the private operator to manipulate or exploit the contract are not sufficiently 
constrained by judicial, political, international and regulatory institutions, the 
performance of a privately operated water utility will be negatively affected.   
 
FIGURE 4: THEORETICALLY DERIVED HYPOTHESIS AND VARIABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test the central hypothesis it is necessary to explore, whether the regulatory 
regime/transaction situation provides the political and administrative actors and the 
private operator with the incentives and the potential to manipulate or exploit the 
contract. The incentives and the potential for manipulation or exploitation are regarded 
as being low if sufficient constraints are established. These constraints are specified in 
the following concrete hypothesis:  
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Concrete hypothesis: If, (a) substantive restraints (regulatory institutions) on 
regulatory discretion, and (b) formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory 
system, and (c) institutions that enforce both the substantive restraints and restraints on 
system changes are properly established, the potential for manipulation or exploitation 
by political and administrative actors and by the private operator is low, and thus the 
institutional framework will not negatively affect the performance of a privately 
operated utility. 
A number of sub-hypotheses can be derived from this concrete hypothesis.  
These are listed as follows: 
Sub-Hypothesis 1: Weak performance (i.e. operator’s failure to fulfil 
obligations and to attain goals and targets set in the contract) arises, when judicial 
institutions are incapable of enforcing both substantive restraints and restraints on 
system changes and when there are no international institutions that are able to 
compensate for this lack, and thus an opportunistic behaviour of 
political/administrative actors and the private operator is likely.  
This is because judicial institutions that provide for the rule of law are the basic 
precondition that support regulatory institutions and the stability of legislation. The rule 
of law makes the disregard of laws and contractual rules extremely costly for both the 
public and the private contracting party. However, if the judicial institutions are not 
independent, international institutions might secure sufficient commitment, for example 
through international monitoring. In other words, weak performance is likely to arise  
when independent judicial institutions are lacking and when there are no international 
institutions that are capable of compensating for this lack.  
Sub-Hypothesis 2: Weak performance arises, when – despite the existence of 
rule of law – the checks and balances are not sufficient to prevent legislative changes of 
the regulatory system and sufficient commitment is not secured through informal 
constraints or an institutionalized consensual process or contract law or international 
institutions.  
This is because in a system where the executive is not constrained by horizontal 
and vertical checks and balances and the electoral system produces two alternating 
parties with very different interests, a change in the priorities of the government or a 
change of the executive power from one party to the other may easily result in 
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legislative changes. Hence, if the potentially instable legislation is not balanced by non-
legislative substantive constraints87 or international institutions, the discretion of 
political and administrative actors is insufficiently constrained. In anticipation of this 
instability and where there is a lack of contractual covenants, the private operator might 
behave opportunistically and try to exploit the contract. In other words, weak 
performance arises when element (b) of the concrete hypothesis is missing and this lack 
is not compensated by non-legislative constituents of element (a) or by international 
institutions.  
However, this means that a lack of checks and balances may be compensated 
through substantive constraints. The reason for this is that even if a new government 
comes to power it comes across the same given informal constraints, international 
institutions, and consensual processes. At the same time it is difficult for it to 
unilaterally change specific rules set in the contract if there is rule of law. The room for 
opportunistic governmental behaviour becomes even smaller, when a number of 
substantive constraints are established. 
Sub-Hypothesis 3: Weak performance arises, when – despite the existence of the 
rule of law or constraining international institutions, and – despite sufficient checks and 
balances that legally restrain system changes, the regulatory process is not written in 
administrative law (juridification of the water sector) or in the contract (through 
specific regulatory constraints) and thus opportunistic behaviour of 
political/administrative actors and the private operator is likely.   
This is because regulatory discretion is unchecked, if the process by which 
regulatory decisions are to be taken, is unspecified. In recognition of this lack of 
regulation and thus exposed to the risk of arbitrary interference by political and 
administrative actors, also the private operator might behave opportunistically. In other 
words, weak performance arises when element (a) of the concrete hypothesis is missing.  
The preceding hypotheses are based on the assumption that some constraining 
institutions may compensate for a lack of another.  International institutions, for 
example, may have a constraining effect on opportunistic behaviour, when the other 
conditions are lacking.  This may be the case, when international institutions exert 
                                                 
87 ‘Non-legislative substantive constraints‘ refer here to those constraints that cannot be altered through a change in 
the legislation, like informal constraints (Civil society monitoring and institutionalized consensual processes) and 
contract law. Thereto does not belong administrative law which can be altered through a change in legislation. 
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formal or informal pressure on the involved actors, which restrains them from behaving 
opportunistically. For example, in the case where judicial or regulatory constraints are 
weak, substantive restraints on opportunistic behaviour might still be effectively 
enforced, if a high international awareness of the contract (for example through donor 
monitoring) is combined with a strong concern of the government about its international 
reputation (for example due to a high dependency on international financial assistance). 
Even when all the conditions described above are present, however, this is not 
necessarily a sufficient condition or guarantee for good performance in the actual 
contract (as a range of other variables will clearly be involved in such performance).  
However, they are nevertheless clearly one of the important determinants.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The case that was chosen in this study to test the hypotheses set out in the 
previous chapter is the Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Services in the 
Amman Governorate, Jordan.  As with most countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, Jordan faces acute problems in the water sector due to its arid to 
semi-arid environment. Experience with private sector participation in the MENA 
region is rare since only 3% of the 158 water contracts signed in middle and low-
income countries in the 1990s were in the MENA region.88  Jordan is of particular  
interest, partly because it ranks among the world’s seven poorest countries when it 
comes to its water resources,89 and partly because, together with Morocco, it was one of 
the pioneers in the region regarding the implementation of PSPs in the water sector.90 
However, each of  these two countries has adopted a different strategy with regard to the 
type of partnerships chosen.  While Morocco relies on concessions, Jordan has preferred 
the less risky option of a management contract.  As much of the previous research has 
been biased towards the former type of PSP (of the larger scale concessionary type),91 
the Amman Management Contract (MC) in Jordan presents an interesting opportunity to 
redress this imbalance.  The case is furthermore very suitable because it was Jordan’s 
first PSP experience in the water sector and the management contract has only recently 
ended, thus enabling a full project cycle to be taken into account.  
3.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR THE CASE STUDY 
To apply the theoretical framework to the case of the Management Contract for 
Water and Wastewater Services in the Amman Governorate, the following specific 
research questions need to be answered: 
                                                 
88 cf. Attia, Bayoumi, 2002 
89 cf. United Nations, 2003, p.34 
90 cf. Attia, Bayoumi, 2002 
91 cf. Palaniappan, Meena, et al., 2006, p.5 and World Bank, 2005, p.23f 
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• Background knowledge: What is the country’s economic, political and social 
situation? How is the Jordanian water sector situated? What does the Amman 
Management Contract (MC) look like?  
• Independent variable: What kind of political and judicial institutions exist in 
Jordan?  What kind of international institutions affect the transaction? What 
kind of substantive constraints are established?  
• Intermediary variable: Which incentives and potential do political/ 
administrative actors and the private operator have to manipulate or exploit 
the contract? What is the degree of occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by 
the contracting parties? Have the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
been effective? 
• Dependent variable: How successful has the operator been in fulfilling its  
obligations and attaining the goals and targets set in the contract?  
3.3 DATA NEEDS AND INDICATORS  
In order to answer the research questions and to test the hypothesis in the case 
study, sets of indicators for the independent, the intermediary and the dependent 
variable were be developed.  These are set out below (and included in tabular form in  
annex A).  
3.3.1 Independent Variable: Judicial, Political, International and Regulatory 
 Institutions 
For an assessment of the independent variable, the judicial, political, regulatory 
(substantive constraints) and international institutions have to be distinguished. As far 
as judicial institutions are concerned two indicators will be used to test the existence of 
the rule of law.  These are independence of the judiciary (J.1.) and protection of 
property rights (J.2). While quite a number of indicators are commonly used to 
measure the rule of law,92 the author regards these two indicators as the most important 
ones in the context of an investigation into state-private sector interaction. This is 
because judicial independence shows how far the state and other external (e.g. private) 
actors are able to influence and interfere with the legal system. This may occur either in 
formal and legalized ways or informally and by corruption. By looking at the history of 
                                                 
92 cf. Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, Massimo, 2003, p.96 
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property rights protection in a country, meaningful information is gathered on the extent 
to which basic rights of private businesses have been respected. To assess the 
independence of the judiciary Levy and Spiller have opted to measure the extent of 
perceived judicial corruption93 and to analyze if there is a history of court decisions 
against the government, as they have found these two features to be the key 
determinants.94 These two measurements will be complemented by looking at the 
appointment mechanisms for judges, which allows for drawing conclusions about 
legalized possibilities of influence by the state. The protection of property rights is 
verified by checking if property rights have been upheld efficiently in the past. 
 
FIGURE 5: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Independent variable Indicators Measurements 
Ju
di
ci
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Existence of rule of 
law 
J.1Independence  
of the judiciary 
• Appointment of judges does not lie in the sole 
responsibility of the executive 
• Extent of perceived corruption in the judiciary 
• Occurrence of former courts’ decisions against  the 
government 
J.2 Protection of 
property rights • Tradition of efficiently upholding property rights 
 
Political institutions can pose legal constraints on the discretion of the executive 
if they include checks and balances (Po.1). These can firstly comprise a constitution 
and a full separation of powers, which limit the legislative power of the executive. 
Furthermore the institution of two legislative houses elected under different voting rules 
can create electoral checks and balances. An electoral system with proportional 
representation, which tends to produce a larger number of parties usually requires 
coalition rule and thus puts another constraint on political discretion. Finally,  
federalism and/or strong decentralization can provide constraints through a vertical 
separation of powers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 The need to measure the perceived corruption is owed to the fact that corruption is covert and therefore “it is 
virtually impossible to come up with precise objective measures of it”. (Kaufmann, Daniel; Kraay, Aart; Mastruzzi, 
Massimo, 2007, p.321) 
94 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.208 
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FIGURE 6: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Independent variable Indicators Measurements 
Po
lit
ic
al
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Legal constraints on 
the discretion of the 
executive 
Po.1 Checks and 
Balances 
• Existence of a constitution 
• Full separation of powers 
• Two legislative houses elected under different 
voting rules 
• Electoral system with proportional representation 
• Federalism with strong decentralization 
 
 
Indicators for regulatory institutions constraining the discretion of political and 
administrative actors and the private operator are four-fold.  First, they include a  
proper juridification of the water sector (S.1), which will be evaluated by checking if 
specialized government agencies for the regulation of the water sector exist, if their 
responsibilities are clearly assigned and if the regulator is autonomous. The autonomy 
of the regulator is given, when the regulator “is free to make decisions within [its] scope 
of authority without having to obtain prior approval from other officials or agencies of 
the government”.95 
Secondly, they include informal (civil) society monitoring (S.2) which may 
pose informal constraints on both parties. ‘Civil society’ is understood here as 
comprising all citizens that are organized in non-governmental organizations and are 
committed to regularly monitoring the water sector. ‘Society’, on the other hand, is 
defined as comprising all non-organized citizens that are informally and irregularly 
observing the water sector. It is assumed that due to the importance of water for the 
people, informal monitoring by civil society organizations or the unorganized society 
puts pressure on political actors and the private operator to provide water and 
wastewater services of a good quality. To determine if (civil) society in Jordan is 
effectively monitoring the water sector, the author will analyze to what extent the 
society is organized, informed and consulted as a stakeholder. The degree of 
organization of society is assessed by taking into account the number of civil society 
organizations that are monitoring the sector and their freedom to monitor it without 
restrictions. Thereby it is assumed that a high number of organizations or fewer but 
prominent organizations will be able to increase the effectiveness of monitoring.  It will 
furthermore be examined if major malfunctions in the water sector have resulted in any 
resignations of politicians from office.  
                                                 
95 Brown, Ashley C.; Stern, Jon, 2006, p.59 
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Thirdly, an institutionalized consensual process (S.3) in the water sector 
regulation may put process constraints on the discretion of the public contracting party. 
A ‘consensual process’ is not understood here in the narrow sense of unanimity in 
voting, but shall refer to a process of argumentation and consensus formation. If 
institutionalized consensual processes within the regulatory agencies precede the 
regulatory decision-making, this may prevent single administrative or political actors 
from behaving opportunistically. Thus, such a process may compensate for a lack of 
checks and balances.  
Fourthly, specific regulatory constraints (S.4), such as complex rules, may 
limit the potential for opportunism of the public and private contracting party. The 
author will therefore investigate if price-setting procedures, conflict resolution 
procedures, arbitration mechanisms, monitoring systems, penalty provisions and 
performance incentives are specified in the contract.  
FIGURE 7:INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS 
Independent variable Indicators Measurements 
R
eg
ul
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y 
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sti
tu
tio
ns
 
Administrative 
constraints on the 
discretion of public 
and private 
contracting parties 
S.1 Proper 
juridification of the 
water sector 
• Existence of specialized government agencies for 
the regulation of the water sector 
• Clear responsibility assignment among regulating 
agencies in the water sector 
• Autonomy of the regulator 
Informal constraints 
on the discretion of 
public and private 
contracting parties 
S.2 Informal (civil) 
society monitoring 
• Degree to which the civil society is organized 
• Degree to which the civil society is consulted as a 
stakeholder 
• Coverage and discussion of water sector policies 
and outcomes in the press 
• Realization of public awareness campaigns by 
public or private contracting party 
• Resignations of politicians from office as a 
consequence to malfunctions in the water sector in 
the past  
Process constraints 
on the discretion of 
the public contracting 
party 
S.3 Institutiona-
lized consensual 
processes 
• Institutionalized process of argumentation and 
consensus formation in the water sector regulation 
Specific regulatory 
constraints on the 
discretion of public 
and private 
contracting parties 
S.4 Specific 
regulatory 
constraints 
• Complex specific rules for the water sector (price-
setting procedures, conflict resolution procedures, 
arbitration mechanisms, monitoring systems, 
penalty provisions, performance incentives) 
 
Finally, international institutions affect the potential for arbitrary action when 
the government is interested in international investments and trade and is dependent on 
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international financial assistance.96 Indicators chosen for these constraints are the 
submission to international economic institutions (I.1) and the existence of 
international or bilateral monitoring (I.2). A membership in international economic 
organizations (such as the World Trade Organization, WTO) constrains the behaviour of 
the public contracting party through the rules that such organizations impose on a 
country. Furthermore, the application for membership of such organisations expresses 
an interest in international trade and investments and is a sign of the government’s 
concern about its reputation with such organizations and investors. The membership of 
a country in international economic institutions may also have an impact on the private 
partner, who engages in a transaction with the country. This is because such economic 
institutions may stipulate procedures that are relevant for the enforcement of contracts. 
Thus, both parties of a transaction are affected.  If international development agencies 
are involved in the transaction, for instance by supporting expenses associated with the 
contract, or if loans involve conditions on disbursement, these agencies have an interest 
in knowing if the recipients are using the finance adequately and if they are fulfilling the 
conditions for disbursement. For this purpose the financing agency and the recipient 
may have agreed upon monitoring mechanisms. But monitoring may also take place 
informally in the sense that an international or bilateral agency may not officially be 
part of the monitoring processes put in place, but is still engaged in the sector, for 
example through technical assistance, and therefore observing its performance. In such 
kinds of settings a state will be required to show commitment and a good performance 
to be able to attract future assistance. The higher the dependence of a country on such 
financial and technical assistance the higher is likely to be the government’s 
commitment. International or bilateral monitoring may also affect the potential for 
opportunism of the private contracting party that is concerned about its reputation. 
However, the effect of international monitoring on the private partner is not usually 
formally established and can thus be expected to have a lower impact than on the public 
partner.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 cf. Shirley, Mary M.; Ménard, Claude, 2002, p.24 
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FIGURE 8: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Independent variable Indicators Measurements 
In
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l i
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tit
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io
ns
  
 
International 
constraints on the 
discretion of the 
public and private 
contracting party 
 
 
I.1 Submission to 
international 
economic 
institutions 
• Application for, or membership in international 
economic organizations 
• Policies favouring foreign investment and trade 
I.2 International or 
bilateral 
monitoring 
• Loans from development organizations for the 
transaction which involve monitoring  
• Other international/ bilateral involvement in the 
transaction which entails either formal or informal 
monitoring (through technical assistance, for 
example) 
3.3.2 Intermediary Variable: Potential for Opportunism 
For the assessment of the intermediary variable, the potential for opportunism by 
political/administrative actors and the private operator, one can – as the potential itself 
is hardly measurable – instead measure the degree of occurrence of opportunistic 
behaviour by political and administrative actors (R.1). Signs of occurrence include 
unilateral changes of the contract or attempts to do so, as well as contractual violations. 
In addition, renegotiations may indicate opportunistic behaviour, but in this case the 
reasons for renegotiation need to be examined in detail. The simple occurrence of a 
renegotiation is not an ample indicator for opportunistic action. A further hint of 
manipulation or exploitation may be conflicts between the regulator and the operator, 
but in order to rate them as opportunistically motivated, the quality of the conflict needs 
to be assessed. Another indicator for an insufficiently constrained potential for 
opportunism is ineffective monitoring and enforcement (R.2). This can be measured 
by checking if the monitoring mechanisms were actually suitable for overcoming 
communication problems and information asymmetries, and if administrative 
capabilities were sufficient to properly monitor the operator and to apply the stipulated 
enforcement mechanisms. A state of asymmetric information is present when one party, 
typically the operator, has more or better information than the other party. The regulator 
usually tries collect information, for example through its own inspections, or through 
reports submiited by the operator.  If these monitoring and reporting mechanisms fail to 
provide the necessary information on the performance of the operator, room for 
opportunism emerges.  
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FIGURE 9: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR THE REGULATORY REGIME/TRANSACTION 
SITUATION 
Intermediary variable Indicators Measurements 
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 T
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n 
si
tu
at
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n 
Incentives and 
potential of 
political/administrative 
actors and the private 
operator 
to manipulate or 
exploit the contract 
R.1 Degree of 
occurrence of 
opportunistic 
behaviour by 
political/administrative 
actors and the private 
operator 
• (No) Push for renegotiation of the contract 
by either side 
• (No) Unilateral changes of the contract by 
political/administrative actors 
• (No) Attempts by political/administrative 
actors to unilaterally change the contract 
• (No) Contractual violations by either side 
• (No) Failure by private operator to report 
regularly and properly to the regulator 
• Quality of disagreements between political/ 
admin. actors and the private operator 
R.2 (In-) Effective  
monitoring and 
enforcement  
• (In-)Sufficient mechanisms to overcome 
information asymmetries 
• (In-)Sufficient administrative capabilities to 
properly monitor the operator and to apply 
stipulated enforcement mechanisms 
3.3.3 Dependent Variable: Performance of the Privately Operated Water Utility 
Finally, for the variable of the performance of the privately operated water 
utility, it is necessary to assess the operator’s success or failure in fulfilling contractual 
goals and targets, for which the indicator will be the (Non-) Compliance of results 
with contractual obligations, goals and targets at the end of the contract (Pf.1).  
This can be measured by comparing the goals and targets in the contract with the 
outcome of the transaction. In case that renegotiations have changed the stipulated 
targets the outcome will be assessed both against original and changed targets. If the 
results of these two assessments differ with regard to the compliance, it will be taken 
into account if the renegotiations were opportunistically motivated or not (as assessed 
for the intermediary variable). 
FIGURE 10: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY 
OPERATED WATER UTILITY 
Dependent variable Indicators Measurements 
Pe
rf
or
m
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ce
 o
f  
th
e 
ut
ili
ty
 Operator’s success/ failure to fulfil 
obligations and to 
attain goals and 
targets set in the 
contract 
Pf.1 (Non-) 
Compliance of 
results with 
contractual 
obligations, goals 
and targets at the 
end of the contract 
• Comparison of obligations/ goals/ targets stated in 
the contract with output/ outcome of the 
transaction  
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3.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
The data was gathered through qualitative research techniques during a field 
research period in Amman comprising desk research of secondary sources, 
supplemented by primary data collected through interviews.  
3.4.1 Interviews 
The interviews were designed and conducted as semi-structured interviews, with 
a number of open-ended comment questions, which served to add observed, anecdotal 
and perception-based information as respondents were allowed to express themselves as 
they wish. Two different sets of questions were prepared.  The first set was used in 
interviews with the staff of political foundations and NGOs and served to verify the 
indicators for the judicial institutions, the political institutions and international 
institutions.  The he second set was used in interviews with water and privatization 
experts as well as the relevant personnel in the government and served to verify the 
indicators for international institutions, regulatory institutions, the regulatory 
regime/transaction situation and the performance of the private operator. In addition, the 
interviews provided the occasion to obtain important documents from the interviewees. 
A number of limitations arose, however, with regard to the available interview partners. 
Some interviews with government staff and experts could not be arranged, and it was 
not possible to interview representatives from the private contract operator LEMA 
(Lyonnaise Des Eaux-Montgomery Watson and Arabtech Jardaneh) because they were 
not present in Jordan anymore as the contract had ended.  A list of the main interview 
partners is provided in Annex II.  The interview questions addressed to politial 
foundations and NGOs are included as Annex III.  And the interview questions 
addressed to water privatisation experts and government officials are included as Annex 
IV.    
3.4.2 Desk Research 
The secondary data that was used for the examination of this case includes: 
• The Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Services in the 
Amman Governorate that provides information about the contractual clauses, 
which is needed to judge upon violations of the contract. 
• Documents associated with the transaction, which were published by the 
involved Jordanian governmental and administrative institutions to obtain an 
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understanding of the activities of the institutions and the relation between the 
government and the operator. 
• Documents associated with the transaction, which were published by LEMA 
to acquire information about the position of the operator.  
• Documents associated with the transaction, published by the World Bank 
that financed this project, in order to gather information on its potential 
monitoring role and further information on the performance of the 
government and the operator.  
• Performance evaluations by Suleiman (2002), Rothenberger (2006), as well 
as assessments by the United Nations (2003), and the World Bank (2007) in 
order to obtain information and evidence in relation to the various 
variables.97 
• Previous research on the subject, including that on the Jordanian political 
system. 
3.5 METHODS OF DATA PROCESSING 
The hypothesis and sub-hypotheses are tested through the information collected 
from the interviews as well as from desk research. The qualitative analysis of the data 
provides insight into the institutional environment, the regulatory regime and the 
performance of the operator. Then, the link from the independent to the intermediary 
variable is drawn through an argumentative conclusion in the sense that the extent to 
which the discretion is constrained explains the degree of opportunistic action (in case 
that this assumption is confirmed by the data). The performance of the operator then 
results from the occurrence or non-occurrence of opportunistic action and thus 
establishes the link between the intermediary and the dependent variable. Thus, it will 
be possible to test the assumptions of the hypothesis and sub-hypotheses. The result of 
this test will allow the author to draw conclusions about the validity of the theoretical 
framework of Levy and Spiller and the modifications made for the case study. Possible 
                                                 
97 Suleiman evaluated the Amman Management Contract in 2002, i.e. three years after its start. Rothenberger made 
a brief case study of the Amman Management Contract in 2004 and updated it in 2006. The United Nations in 2003 
assessed the role of the private sector in the development and management of water supply in selected ESCWA 
member countries including Jordan. The World Bank published in 2007 after the end of the contract an 
“Implementation Completion and Results Report” on the loan provided for the Amman Water and Sanitation 
Management Project, which among other things financed the Amman Management Contract. 
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limitations that result from the chosen method are that no quantitative statements can be 
made about the degree to which each criterion had an impact on the dependent variable. 
This is because the interviews and desk studies are of a qualitative nature. Although 
perceptions about the degree of impact could have been obtained through the use of 
questionnaires, it was felt that these perceptions would be based upon rough estimates, 
and a small sample of interview partners would not be fully representative.  The author 
therefore decided not analyse statistically the degree to which each criterion has affected 
the dependent variable.  
3.6 ETHICS STATEMENT 
All the persons interviewed for this study were asked whether they would be 
happy to have their identities revealed in the thesis. Those that agreed to this are listed 
in Annex 2.  In other cases, confidentiality of data gathered was assured by not 
attributing specific details gathered from the interviews to particular individuals.  The 
sole purpose of using the data gathered for this mini-thesis was communicated to all the 
respondents. The choice of not answering questions raised was also respected. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE CASE STUDY 
 This chapter provides a brief overview of Jordan’s political, economic and social 
situation, of the Jordanian water sector and the pre-privatization situation, and of the 
management contract for water and wastewater services.    More specific detail on the 
political, judicial and constitutional systems is provided in Chapter 5.  
4.1 JORDAN‘S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SITUATION 
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Great Britain 
and France divided the region amongst them. In 1920, Great Britain established the state 
of Transjordan and proclaimed Abdallah Ibn Hussein as king. Having achieved its 
independence from British rule in 1946, the Emirate of Transjordan was renamed three 
years later as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The country has been decisively 
influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which has heavily affected the country’s 
population structure through the influx of Palestinian refugees and has created inner-
societal tensions between East-Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.98 
Following the 6-Day-War and the loss of the West Bank in 1967, martial law was 
imposed and not lifted until 1990. Beginning in 1989 the monarchy initiated a gradual 
liberalization that is often attributed to the political and economic crisis in which the 
state found itself during that time. Jordan had to accept an IMF structural adjustment 
programme, which among other things demanded the privatization of state operations.99 
Economic liberalization was accompanied by political reforms such as the restoration of 
parliamentary elections, the lifting of the ban on political parties and the broadening of 
political participation. This process, however, is sometimes viewed as a “defensive 
democratization,” designed primarily to preserve the existing political system and the 
interests of the ruling elite, and thereby to sideline or prevent more fundamental 
reforms.100 
Two structural features that have evolved since Jordan’s independence 
characterize its politics until today: First, the shortage of economic resources in the 
                                                 
98 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.36f 
99 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.129 
100 Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.51 
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Kingdom (few natural resources, barely developed industrial sector, only 6% of the land 
is arable101) has made it strongly dependent on external financial sources. Jordan may be 
referred to as a semi-rentier economy.102 While the notion ‘rentier economy’ describes 
states with a direct financial source (such as oil in the Arab Gulf States), the semi-
rentier status refers to the country’s dependence on financial sources from abroad. In the 
case of Jordan these are made up of remittances from Jordanian migrant workers in the 
Gulf States, of financial aid from the Gulf States, and of credits and other forms of 
development assistance from western countries and international agencies.103 Such 
assistance has been flowing mainly because of Jordan’s important geostrategic location, 
the admittance of thousands of Palestinian refugees and the country’s constant efforts to 
suit and balance international and regional interests. As a consequence of this financial 
inflow the Jordanian producing economy plays a subordinate role in the state budget.104 
The need to acquire rents limits the room for Jordanian foreign policy and puts pressure 
on the state to meet demands of international financiers for the establishment of a 
democratic system.105 
The second feature that characterizes Jordanian politics is neo-patrimonialism, 
which can be defined as a form of rule which has its legitimacy in traditional loyalties 
and the allocation of goods and services. It is combined with modern forms of state 
organization (such as a modern bureaucracy).106 Since the 1950s the Hashemite 
monarchy has been relying considerably on the loyalty of east-Jordanian tribes as many 
Palestinian-Jordanians have challenged the institution of the monarchy.107 This is 
reflected in the electoral law, which privileges rural constituencies and cultivates 
tribalism. To safeguard the monarchy, the royal court has furthermore relied on 
clientelistic mechanisms and elite rotation. The Jordanian elites, located mainly in the 
bureaucracy, have divided the power, the resources and the access to them amongst 
themselves. They dominate the connections between the political elite and the society 
by allocating employment, social status and privileges of all kinds. This system is know 
locally as ‘Wasta’ which may be translated as ‘connections’ with tribe, clan or family 
                                                 
101 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.1 
102 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.124 
103 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.43f 
104 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.44 
105 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.388 
106 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.52 
107 cf. Baaklini, Abdo; Denoeux, Guilain; Springborg, Robert, 1999, p.140 
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patrons.  Wasta has  led to the bypassing state institutions108, hinders the development 
of civil society organizations109 and has had a detrimental influence on Jordan’s 
economy.110 Beyond this, the mechanism of elite rotation (typically through frequent 
changes in the cabinet), which is controlled by the monarch, is designed to balance the 
power of various elites as it enables the participation of all elites within the political 
system and the granting of privileges to them. At the same time it may weaken the 
opposition (as frequent changes of the cabinet have shown) and is designed to prevent 
the monopolization of administrative and political posts through single clans or 
tribes.111 
FIGURE 11: MAP OF JORDAN 
 
Source: Joffé, George, 2002, Cover 
                                                 
108 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.54 
109 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.382 
110 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.123 
111 cf. Ben Salha, Edwige, 2003, p.55f 
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4.2 THE JORDANIAN WATER SECTOR AND THE PRE-PRIVATIZATION 
 SITUATION 
In its Water Strategy of 1997 the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MWI) asserts that the demographic pressure on Jordan’s water resources is at its 
highest, while it is expected that from 2005 on no further freshwater resources can be 
developed.112 What makes this prediction more severe is that from 1973 until today 
renewable groundwater resources have decreased by 66%.113 Besides the problem of 
overexploitation, the MWI also acknowledges that operation and maintenance costs are 
very high.  This is especially true for the capital city of Amman that is distant from the 
country’s main water resources. Acknowledging these facts, the ministry opts in its 
Water Strategy for improved resource management, wastewater reuse, institutional 
restructuring, stakeholder participation, regional cooperation, raising public awareness, 
performance measurement, health standards, cost recovery, private sector participation 
and water research to address these challenges.114  
Private sector participation has also been encouraged by the World Bank, which 
has concluded from eight previous World Bank funded water supply projects in Jordan 
(with public sector operators) that public sector management has failed to improve 
service levels, which steadily declined during the 1990s.115 Until 1999 the country had 
been divided into twelve administrative governorates, each of which had their own  
public providers.  These providers had been subjected to the supervision of the central 
Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ), which had also been entrusted with the overall 
management of water resources and the regulation of groundwater use. The provider 
that had been responsible for Amman is the Amman Governorate Water Administration 
(AGWA). The Amman Governorate includes 2.2 million customers who represent  45% 
of Jordan’s total drinking water consumption.116 Local water providers such as AGWA 
were set up as autonomous units,117 but “due to the rigidity of laws and by-laws” had de 
facto ended up being “centrally managed, budgeted and staffed” by the WAJ.118 Thus, 
until the end of the 1990s, the WAJ had been carrying full responsibility for water 
supply and sanitation along with the task of regulatory supervision in the whole of 
                                                 
112 cf. Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 1997 
113 cf. Al Baz, Ismail; De Florio, Loredana; Bethmann, Andreas, 2007, p.388  
114 cf. Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 1997 
115 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.1 
116 cf. Suleiman, Rebhieh, 2002, p.16 
117 cf. Abu-Shams, Ibrahim; Rabadi, Akram, 2003, p.161 
118 Abu-Shams, Ibrahim; Rabadi, Akram, 2003, p.161 
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Jordan.119 At the beginning of 1999 AGWA experienced losses of about 2.6 million 
Jordanian Dinar (approx. 3.1 million Euro).120 Unaccounted-for-water (UFW)121 levels 
at  54% were excessively high and supply was intermittent with only eight hours per 
week in peak season.122 The failure to improve service levels under public sector 
operation was one decisive factor that put pressure on the Jordanian government to 
involve the private sector. Another important reason was a case of water pollution in 
1997, which created a strong call for action.123 In the wake of a privatization programme 
embarked on in 1997, the Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Services in 
the Amman Governorate was the first PSP that the government implemented in 1999 in 
the water sector. 
4.3 THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT FOR WATER AND WASTEWATER 
 SERVICES  
The PSP option that the Jordanian Government chose to improve water supply 
and sanitation in the Amman Governorate was a performance-based management 
contract. The original duration of the contract was four years, but it was extended twice, 
thus extending it to seven years and five months.124  It started on 31 July 1999 and 
ended on 31 December 2006.  The main goals were to improve efficiency particularly 
through the reduction of unaccounted-for-water, to increase sales revenues, to extend 
the hours of water supply, to secure water quality and to operate an efficient customer 
service.125 The competitive bid for the contract was won by a joint venture of Suez 
Lyonnaise Des Eaux and Montgomery Watson Arabtech Jardaneh (LEMA). With the 
signing of the contract between the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) and LEMA, the 
private operator took full responsibility for technical operations and partial 
responsibility for administrative management, both in drinking water production and 
distribution as well as wastewater collection and treatment.126 The tasks of the operator 
were to carry out and improve the operation and maintenance of the facilities (including 
                                                 
119 cf. Meuss, Marina; Stoll, Uwe; Barmeier, Nina, 2006, p. 2 
120 cf. Programme Management Unit, 2007 
121 “Unaccounted-for-water is the share of water system input that is unknown in quantity and in use, such as water 
leaked in the distribution system (technical losses), water stolen (as in illegal connections), imperfectly recorded (as 
in under-registering meters or through collusion between meter readers and consumers), poorly estimated in the 
commercial system (administrative losses)”. (World Bank, 2007, p.19) 
122 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.iii 
123 Rothenberger, Dieter, 16.09.07 
124 Starting date: 31.07.1999; ending date 31.12.2006 
125 cf. Suleiman, Rebhieh, 2002, p.16 
126 cf. SUEZ, 2003, p.17 
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UFW, constancy of supply and water quality) as well as the billing, collection and 
customer services (including accounts receivables), and to rehabilitate the facilities 
under an Operating Investment Fund.127  
By transferring such tasks, a management contract is generally capable of 
improving technical and managerial capabilities as well as the operating efficiency.128 
Yet, this PSP arrangement brings no private investment into the infrastructure and the 
ownership remains fully public. The financing of both the operation and infrastructure 
investments, however, was provided externally by donors. The management contract 
was part of the Amman Water and Sanitation Management Project (AWSMP), which 
had four project components: the Management contract, an Operating Investment Fund 
(OIF), a Capital Investment Programme (CIP), and technical assistance. With a loan of 
US$ 55 million, the World Bank fully financed the first two components while the Bank 
had assembled co-financiers for the latter two components, namely the European 
Investment Bank, Italian bilateral assistance, KfW (German financial cooperation), and 
USAID. The OIF financed short-term and operating investments that were not covered 
by LEMA’s working capital. Money from the CIP was reserved for restructuring and 
rehabilitating the network as well as for upgrading and extending service coverage, 
whereas the implementation of the Capital Investment Programme remained in the 
responsibility of WAJ.129  
The contract stipulated the compensation of LEMA through a fixed base fee and 
a variable performance incentive compensation (PIC) paid by WAJ. The latter was a 
function of three factors: revenue optimization, collection efficiency and cost control.130 
From the maximum annual PIC of 5%,131 liquidated damages might be withdrawn by 
WAJ in the case that LEMA did not meet the performance targets. Through this kind of 
compensation the private operator did not rely on revenues for its reward (as in 
management contracts generally). Nevertheless, in a management contract some 
entrepreneurial risk is still prevalent,132 but compared to other PSP options it is rather 
low.133 The investments made by LEMA are confined to costs of informing, bargaining 
                                                 
127 cf. Bankworld Inc, 2007, p.i 
128 cf. Saghir, Jamal, 2000, p.26 
129 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.3 
130 cf. Suleiman, Rebhieh, 2002, p.22 
131 Percentage of the incremental improvement of cash flow (World Bank, 2007, p.14) 
132 cf. chapter 4.3 
133 cf. Ringskog, Klas; Hammond, Mary Ellen; Locussol, Alain, 2006, p.1 
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and setting up a business in Jordan. Even if these kinds of investments are hardly 
transferable, the total of those sunk investments is relatively small. Yet, besides material 
investments companies have also invested in their reputation, which is – as argued 
before – of particular importance in the water sector. Still, the contract type suggests 
that the potential by political and administrative actors to manipulate or exploit the 
contract is limited. Major opportunistic action, such as the refusal to pay the full fixed 
fee despite proper conduct by LEMA may simply make the operator discontinue its 
operations, which is not in the interest of the public contracting party. Minor breaches 
of the contract are, however, conceivable as the private operator has an interest in 
completing the contract successfully. Indeed, the bidding for the contract shows that the 
bidders were risk-averse even in this low-risk setting. The bidders had been allowed to 
bid on the share of the performance incentive compensation in relation to the fixed fee 
and LEMA bade the minimum percentage of 5%.134 This is noteworthy as the 
management contract is already a governance structure with a minor risk. It may simply 
indicate that LEMA had expected not to be able to increase the financial performance 
considerably and thus not to profit much from the PIC. Another explanation for this 
risk-averse bid might be that the entity (WAJ) that is in charge of deciding about the 
amount of liquidated damages which may be withdrawn from the PIC is not an 
independent body.  The WAJ is advised by an independent auditor, but does not need to 
follow this advice. This opens up room for opportunism by the public contracting party. 
The bid therefore may suggest that LEMA, in anticipation of this potential for 
opportunism from its contracting partner, decided to minimize the effects that such 
behaviour could have on its compensation.  
The governance structure of a management contract-type furthermore indicates 
that “a close and trustful co-operation with the public side is required”135 as the operator 
can influence processes only to a very limited degree. The required political 
commitment may be adversely affected, if the political and administrative actors are not 
aware of what the chosen contract option is able to accomplish or if the PSP is to a 
                                                 
134 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.14 
135 Rothenberger, Dieter, 2004, p.39 
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significant part a result of pressure by donors. International development agencies 
noticed these two problems in Amman.136  
The examination of the governance structure and the specific transaction 
situation of the Amman water management contract MC has shown which kind of 
incentive structure results from them. But the incentives and potential for opportunism 
of both contracting parties is – according to the author’s hypothesis – also abated and 
amplified by the institutional environment. This point will be taken up in further detail 
in th following chapter which presents the findings and interpretations that were drawn 
from the field research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings on the impact of institutional frameworks on private 
sector participation, based on the data that was gathered through desk studies and 
interviews carried out during the field research. The chapter is structured into three 
sections representing the independent, intermediary and dependent variables identified 
in Chapters 2 and 3 above. 
5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
5.2.1 Judicial Institutions in Jordan 
Two indicators were identified to assess the existence of rule of law, namely the 
independence of the judiciary and the protection of property rights. 
5.2.1.1  INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY (J.1) 
The independence of the judiciary in Jordan is constitutionally guaranteed.137 
However, the formal institutions on a lower level and the informal system may deviate 
from constitutional institutions. The following assessments intend to further investigate 
the issue. 
Firstly, one can identify the way by which judges are appointed and dismissed. 
These tasks are in the responsibility of Jordan’s Higher Judicial Council, while its 
appointments and dismissals have to be approved by the king.138 According to the 
Independence of the Judiciary law of 2001, the Minister of Justice can recommend to 
the council the appointment of a certain person to a judicial post or give advice against a 
person’s appointment “for reasons which could be personal, political or others”.139 
Besides this, the articles (23 D) and (24 A) give the Minister of Justice the “power to 
recommend to the president of the Judicial Council to appoint a judge to the post of 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice”.140 The council itself consists of the 
speaker of the Upper House (senate), three senators and five senior judges. The three 
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senators are chosen by ballot within the Upper House, members of which are appointed 
by the King. The five judges are selected from the highest civil court in order of 
seniority.141 Freedom House reports that the “judicial appointments are consistently 
criticized as reflecting particularistic interests”.142 The Bertelsmann foundation finds 
that “the judiciary remains subject to political control in certain areas”.143 From the 
formal appointment mechanisms and the reported exertion of control on appointments it 
can be concluded that the executive has substantial influence on the appointment of 
judges, which could be used to put pressure on judges to make the desired rulings. 
Another measurement of judicial independence is the extent of perceived 
corruption in the judiciary. However, finding literature on corruption specifically for the 
judicial sector in Jordan has been a difficult task. Information on public perceptions is 
mainly limited to statements, which find that the public does not have confidence in 
Jordan’s judiciary.144 Other sources conclude on the extent of corruption in the judiciary 
by looking into the legal system. Transparency International has recently published its 
Global Corruption Report 2007, which is dedicated to corruption in judicial systems. 
Although Jordan is not included in the country reports, it is still mentioned in this report 
among the international best practices with regard to legal schemes. It is stated that 
adversarial systems145 usually are “associated with low levels of corruption”146. The 
Islamic legal traditions in Jordan are found to embody such kind of adversarial 
proceedings.147  
A third indication of judicial independence would be the repeated occurrence of 
court’s decisions against the government. The non-governmental organization National 
Democratic Institute reported several cases where the courts ruled against ministries and 
municipalities, in private cases as well as in business cases.148  The NDI is an 
international NGO headquartered in Washington and chaired by former United States 
                                                 
141 cf. Sakijha, Basem; Kilani, Sa'eda, 2001, p.12 
142 Freedom House, 2006 
143 Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2006, p.5 
144 cf. Sakijha, Basem; Kilani, Sa'eda, 2001, p.8 
145 In an adversarial system “the parties to a controversy develop and present their arguments, gather and submit 
evidence, call and question witnesses, and, within the confines of certain rules, control the process. The fact finder, 
usually a judge or jury, remains neutral and passive throughout the proceeding” (Legal dictionary, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Adversary+system). The distinctive feature of this kind of systems is that they tend 
to “increase the capacity of all parties within a dispute to challenge the evidence or resolutions generated by a judge 
or prosecutor”. (Buscaglia, Edgardo, 2007, p.72f) 
146 Buscaglia, Edgardo, 2007, p.72 
147 cf. Buscaglia, Edgardo, 2007, p.72f 
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Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. The organization has more than 50 field 
offices around the world and aims at assisting civil and political leaders in building their 
democratic structures. An example from the political arena for the Jordanian courts’ 
rulings against the government, which the NDI gave, is a court’s decision on a suit filed 
with respect to the parliamentary election of 2007. An individual’s application for 
candidacy had been rejected by the Ministry of Interior as he was seen “unfit for the 
candidacy status”.149 When he filed a suit, the court found the decision of the Ministry 
of Interior to be invalid and the individual was allowed to run for the election. 
In summary, it can be said that the results of the assessments of judicial 
independence are mixed. There is obviously no full independence, because the king has 
a direct control on the appointments and dismissals of judges as he has to approve them. 
Though not possessing this direct control, the Minister of Justice still has the possibility 
to influence appointments as he/she is allowed to give recommendations. The extent to 
which political and administrative actors or the private operator can influence judges 
through other channels could not be verified through the mentioned measurements, as 
the available data on perceived corruption was marginal. The estimation of interview 
partners, however, has been that ‘Wasta’150 also makes its mark on the judiciary.151 An 
incident that happened in 1995, moreover suggests that there are informal channels 
through which political actors at least try to exert pressure. That year 22 of the highest 
judges threatened to resign from office as they complained about the pressure of the 
government on the exercise of their office.  Following negotiations with the Minister of 
Justice, however, these judges subsequently retracted these threats.152 
5.2.1.2  PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (J.2) 
The second indicator that may be used to assess the rule of law is the protection 
of property rights. Personal property is protected from expropriation through the 
constitution and the investment promotion law.153 Legal exceptions are provided for the 
purpose of public utility, but in this case fair compensation has to be paid.154 The 
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150 cf. chapter 6.1 
151 Bröning, Michael, 22.10.07/De Winter, Annemie, 05.11.07 
152 cf. Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.104 
153 cf. El-Sayed Radwan, Mohamed, 1999, p.18 
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assessment of research institutions is that the risk of expropriation in Jordan is very 
low.155 
While the protection of property rights is obviously secured, the assessment of 
the independence of the judiciary has been mixed. Still, the overall evaluation from the 
perspective of international investors on the existence of rule of law is positive. This can 
be derived from an empirical study on the business environment in Jordan from a 
private sector perspective conducted in 1995 by the Centre for Strategic Studies at 
Jordan University. A sample of 151 large firms was selected, including firms that 
provide infrastructure services. Chief Executive Officers were interviewed among other 
things on the impediments and disincentives to investment that they find present in 
Jordan. Eighty three percent of the respondents judged “Bureaucratic impediments” and 
“Impediments related to skills and education” as important obstacles to investment, 
whereas a relatively smaller group, 68 percent of respondents, also identified 
“Legislative and legal impediments” as important obstacles. Within this latter category, 
respondents gave on average a weight each of 27% to the impediment “Multiplicity of 
laws and by-laws” and “Too many changes and amendments to laws”. The impediment            
“Corruption in the application of laws,” however, received only a weight of 18 
percent.156 Therefore, it can be said that the survey found that business executives did 
not assess corruption in the judiciary as a major prior impediment to investments. 
Furthermore, Jordan ranks in the Global Competitiveness Index 2007 with regard to 
judicial independence on position 38 of 128 countries, thus belonging in the top third.157 
With the region as a benchmark, the rule of law in Jordan received a score of 5 on a 
scale from 0-6 while lower scores indicate less rule of law.158 To conclude, the existence 
of rule of law is from an economic perspective apparently satisfactory. Moreover, , 
according to the first hypothesis, weak judicial institutions may in any case be partly 
compensated through international institutions that create pressure to enforce 
substantive restraints and restraints on system changes. 
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5.2.2 Political Institutions in Jordan 
  5.2.2.1  CHECKS AND BALANCES (PO.1) 
The discretion of the executive may be legally constrained by horizontal and 
vertical checks and balances, which make legislation and thus regulatory rules more 
stable. A basic constraint on the executive is the existence of a constitution. Jordan’s 
constitution was established in 1952 and widely respected even in difficult times, when 
martial law was imposed. Though not disregarding it, the extensive powers of the king 
instead allowed him to have the constitution amended by the parliament.159 For example 
in 1976, two years after he had dissolved the parliament, King Hussein desired to 
postpone the parliamentary elections for an unspecified time, but according to the 
constitution he was only allowed to postpone it for up to two years. Hence, the King 
called for an extraordinary session of the parliament. Within one day the parliament 
adopted the amendment desired by the king and afterwards the king dismissed the 
parliament again until its reestablishment in 1984.160 However, since the lifting of 
martial law in 1989 and along with this the beginning of liberalization, the constitution 
has not been subsequently amended.161 
Another potential constraint on the discretion of the executive is the separation 
of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The Jordanian constitution provides 
for a division but not full separation of these powers. While the monarch’s influence on 
the judiciary has already been outlined above, the relation between executive and 
legislature deserves further attention. The system of government is a parliamentary 
constitutional monarchy. The executive authority is vested in the king who exerts his 
power through his ministers. The king appoints the prime minister and the other 
ministers upon proposal of the Prime Minister and has the power to dissolve the 
government. Ministers do not have to be members of parliament. The legislative power 
is vested in the National Assembly, which consists of the Upper House (Senate) and a 
Lower House (House of Representatives). Members of the Senate are appointed by the 
king, while the members of the Lower House are elected by the people by secret ballot 
in a general election.162 The government requires a vote of confidence by the House of 
Representatives and is accountable to it. On the demand of a two-thirds majority in the 
                                                 
159 cf. Baaklini, Abdo; Denoeux, Guilain; Springborg, Robert, 1999, p.145ff. 
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Lower House, the government has to resign, and the Lower House can impeach single 
Ministers. 163 The king, however, has immunity from any responsibility for the actions 
of his government.164 Bills drafted by the cabinet have to be submitted to both houses, 
which have the power to amend or reject them. Legislation can be vetoed by the 
monarch, and this veto can only be overturned by a two-thirds vote in both chambers.165 
The king also has legislative powers. In times when the Parliament is not in session 
(Parliament’s sessions amount to five months annually166) or has been dissolved, the 
Cabinet may pass provisional laws if sanctioned by the king.167 Furthermore, the king 
has the authority to suspend elections, dissolve the Parliament, withdraw single 
members of both houses168 and to extend Parliament’s regular 4-year-term for up to two 
years. The preceding summary of the division of powers has shown that Parliament and 
the judiciary may restrain the executive only to a limited degree. In particular, the  
legislature can “function only within the constitutional and political space granted and 
tolerated by the king”.169  
The Jordanian legislative is bicameral, but this does not constrain the executive, 
as the Upper House is not elected by the people but appointed by the King. Legal 
constraints on the executive are also not promoted by the electoral system in Jordan. 
This is because political parties play only a limited role in Jordan.  The negligible role 
of parties is illustrated by the fact that in the current House of Representatives 75 of 80 
members entered parliament as independent candidates.170 The weakness of the parties 
is one important reason why in Jordan candidates mostly are not elected because of their 
ideological affiliation but rather because of their tribal association.171 Furthermore, in a 
system where an institutionalized access to resources is not promising, clientelism is the 
primary mean to obtain such resources. Therefore, voters tend to vote for those 
candidates with which they have tribal or kinsmanlike relations. This voting behaviour 
is especially problematic in an electoral system such as Jordan’s, where candidates are 
elected based on a first-past-the post basis. The candidate with the highest number of 
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votes enters the parliament after one electoral round only. The votes of the other 
candidates get lost, which would be different in a system with proportional 
representation.172 As a consequence the members of the Lower House represent only a 
minority of the citizens which they try to benefit to keep their loyalty. Due to these 
features of the system, representatives barely form a strong opposition and hence cannot 
put major constraints on the executive. But even if parties played a greater role in 
Jordan this would barely challenge the executive, as the political system does not give 
the largest parliamentary group the right to form the government.173 Thus, it can be said 
that there are few electoral checks and balances on the executive’s discretion.  
The last criterion to be assessed for the political institutions is whether the 
Jordanian system demonstrates strong federal and/or decentralized tendencies. This is 
not the case, as Jordan is a unitary state and although a process of decentralisation 
started in 1989 the powers and importance of the municipalities and governorates is still 
relatively low.174 In the water sector, some results of the decentralization process can be 
seen with the Aqaba Water Company in the south, the management contract in Amman 
and the commercialization of the Northern Governorates, where the establishment of a 
public company is underway. The rest of the country’s water administration is, 
however, still under central control and operation. This means that the executive 
discretion is also not considerably constrained by a vertical separation of powers.  
The examination of political institutions in Jordan has shown that the executive 
is hardly constrained by political checks and balances. However, it is important to 
recognize that much of the executive discretion is limited to the King.  Thus, on the one 
hand it can be assumed that with regard to the direction of the country’s major policies, 
some reliable continuity is provided. On the other hand, the monarch relies on neo-
patrimonial mechanisms and is equipped with the power to put through and control elite 
rotation, which has resulted in frequent (often annual) changes of the ministers.175 
During the term of the management contract six different politicians have served as 
Ministers of Water and Irrigation, although one of them served an unusually long period 
of about four years (2001-2005). Attempts to change the regulatory system in the water 
sector are therefore more likely to occur than in systems where the cabinet regularly 
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changes based on four- or five-year terms. Hence, it can be stated that the checks and 
balances are not sufficient to prevent legislative changes of the regulatory system. Yet, 
according to the second sub-hypothesis, as will be discussed below, sufficient 
commitment may instead be secured through non-legislative substantive constraints or 
international institutions.  
5.2.3 Regulatory Institutions in the Jordanian Water Sector 
The discretion of both the public and private contracting party may be 
constrained by regulatory institutions that exist in the Jordanian water sector. These are 
administrative constraints (Proper juridification of the water sector), informal 
constraints (Informal (civil) society monitoring), process constraints (Institutionalized 
consensual processes), and specific regulatory constraints. 
5.2.3.1  PROPER JURIDIFICATION OF THE WATER SECTOR (S.1) 
To assess if the Jordanian water sector is properly juridificated, it is necessary to 
examine the structure of the water sector, the allocation of responsibilities and the 
degree of autonomy of the regulator. 
The Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) is entrusted with the 
tasks of monitoring, planning, management, the preparation of sector strategies and 
policies as well as water price regulation. The authority that carries nationwide 
responsibility for water supply and sanitation (WSS) and thus has operational as well as 
regulatory functions, is the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ).176 The WAJ was 
established as an autonomous body with financial and administrative independence and 
accordingly has the right to enter legal proceedings and sign contracts, as it did in the 
case of the contract with LEMA. The authority is lead by a Secretary-General and has a 
board of directors, which is chaired by the minister of the MWI.177 The Minister is 
authorized to issue instructions to the WAJ.178 A Programme Management Unit (PMU) 
was set up in 1997 as a monitoring unit within WAJ through a financing agreement 
between the Jordanian government and the European Commission. However, the PMU 
did not start its full operations until 2000.179 The unit has a board of executives, which 
is headed by the Minister and includes the Secretary-Generals of WAJ and of MWI. The 
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PMU’s tasks comprise the management of the Greater Amman Water Sector 
Improvement Programme (GAWSIP) as well as the monitoring of the Capital 
Investment Programme, the Amman Water Management Contract and other PSP 
initiatives in the governorates.180  
FIGURE 12: REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION (WSS) IN JORDAN  
 
Source: Meuss, Marina; Stoll, Uwe; Barmeier, Nina, 2006, p.2 
The problem of the described administrative structure is that the responsibilities 
of the three units are not clearly divided with regard to the tasks of regulation, 
supervision and operation.181 This results partly from the fact that the WAJ had been set 
up long before the MWI was founded, and thus the hierarchical lines needed to be built 
around traditionally established ones.182 Interviewees reported overlapping or unclear 
responsibilities, difficulties to differentiate and coordinate between the units, and 
incidents where WAJ left out the PMU to undertake direct negotiations with LEMA, 
e.g. on incentive payments.183 In particular, the PMU experienced problems in finding  
its role as it was subject to different accountability lines, had only limited decision-
making power, was to a major extent confined to making recommendations,  and started 
its full operations late (about one year after the start of the management contract).184 
Furthermore, the European Commission on the one hand intended to build up the unit to 
a fully-fledged regulator (which raised expectations among PMU staff), while the 
Jordanian government did not have it in mind to give extended regulatory competences 
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to the PMU.185 The effect of these unclear responsibilities within the administration has 
been that the de facto allocation of tasks and responsibilities was dependent on the 
strength of the leadership of each unit. Thus, the discretion of the units varied with the 
change of its top personnel. An example of such kind of irregularities were the 
endeavours of the Secretary-General of the MWI to issue instructions to the WAJ 
though not formally being superior to it.186  
With regard to the autonomy of WAJ, being the main regulator, it can be said 
that, although it was set up as an autonomous unit, this has not been the case in practice.   
In addition to already mentioned formal influences by the Minister and informal 
influences by the MWI’s Secretary-General, the authority was later subjected through 
by-laws to the provisions of the Civil Service Commission, the Audit Bureau, the 
Bureau of Supervision and Inspection, as well as government procurement regulations. 
Thus, the authority’s staff have to be employed under the Civil Service Law, the WAJ 
has to organize its financial accounts according to the regulations of the Audit Bureau, 
and its activities are scrutinized by the mentioned agencies, all of which servies to limit 
its autonomy.187 
The assessment of the administrative structure of the water sector has shown that 
due to the unclear responsibility assignment and the lack of autonomy of the regulator, 
the discretion of the public and private contracting parties was insufficiently 
constrained. With regard to the public contracting party even a proper juridification of 
the water sector would not have provided sufficient constraints. This is because the 
weak checks and balances made the legislation and thus the regulatory rules unstable. 
The described setting also increased the discretionary power of the private operator. The 
unclear assignment of responsibilities allowed the operator to use informal channels to 
pass over certain authorities and to collaborate in a corrupt way with administrative and 
political actors.  
5.2.3.2  INFORMAL (CIVIL) SOCIETY MONITORING (S.2) 
To find out if civil society effectively constrained the discretion of political and 
administrative actors as well as the private operator, the author investigated the extent to 
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which civil society degree the society was organized, consulted and informed. 
Additionally, an investigation was carried out to see if major malfunctions in the water 
sector led to resignations by politicians from office.  
Although since 1989 the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has 
greatly increased, they have been restricted by somewhat authoritarian practices, namely 
“social control projected through a complex array of administrative procedures, legal 
codes, and informal regulative practices designed to constrain opposition without 
resorting to violence”.188 These manifested themselves in three conditions which NGOs 
must fulfil. First, for their application for registration, they have to draft an internal 
document which among other things stipulates precisely the activities that the 
organisation will involve in. Single activities may be crossed out from the list by the 
responsible government officials. If the application is approved, “it serves as a rigid 
guideline for permissible activities” and changes to it have to be approved by the 
government.189 Furthermore, the organisation must adhere to administrative and 
oversight requirements, which provide extensive opportunities to interfere in the affairs 
of the NGO. For example, ministry officials are required to attend the NGO board 
elections and must approve the results.  They can also demand to be given insight into 
the organisation’s financial records, and the NGO has to issue an annual report which 
records information on finances, correspondence, revenues, working members etc.190 
Secondly, NGOs are not allowed to engage in any political activities, since this 
permission is restricted to political parties.191 And thirdly, “assertive and critical 
opposition leadership through NGOs is prohibited.”192 In practice, all this means that  
that all members of NGOs must be approved by the ministry of the interior and the state 
may exclude particular individuals which it deems threatening to state interests from the 
organization. Such sweeping discretionary power of the state substantially limits the 
room for civil society participation in Jordan’s public affairs. 
This marginalization of civil society was mirrored in the water sector. The public 
as one if not the most important stakeholder of water and wastewater services was not 
permitted to participate in decision-making and was not consulted by political or 
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administrative actors.193 The private operator on the other hand interacted with the 
society by undertaking customer satisfaction surveys and awareness campaigns, though 
not obligated to do so by contract.194 However, no such campaigns were undertaken by 
the public awareness directorate of the WAJ.195  The ability of the society or civil 
society to informally monitor the water sector was further constrained by a lack of 
transparency and access to information.196 Press reports contained no details about the 
PSP, nor was the press a forum for discussion.197 Both the public and the private 
contracting party confined the role of the press mainly to publishing their reactions in 
case of service delivery problems or unpopular system changes (such as changes to the 
billing system).198  
Two cases of major drinking-water-pollution-induced infections in Jordan in 
1998 and the latest in 2007 (outside LEMA’s service area) have shown that politicians 
were held accountable following such malfunctions. In the latter case the Minister of 
Water and Irrigation, the Secretary-General of WAJ and the Minister of Health 
resigned. The resignations can be seen as a way to avert a crisis, because with the 
utmost probability a non-resignation would have caused a violent uprising in the streets 
(as did the earlier downsizing of food subventions in 1996).199   
The preceding illustration of the role of civil society makes clear that the 
dominance of the state restricted the organization of society, limited its participation and 
provided little or no information. Thus, civil society organizations were unable to 
informally monitor the sector and accordingly had little or no influence over the 
discretion of the public and private contracting party.200 The power of the unorganized 
civil society interventions limited the potential for opportunism only with regard to such 
kind of opportunistic behaviour which would have caused major malfunctions. And 
even then, as the pollution cases show, much of the society’s power was of a 
retrospective nature and was limited to holding politicians and top-administrative actors 
accountable to some extent. In conclusion, therefore, it is clear that civil society had a 
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very limited ‘monitoring’ role and thus did not constrain the potential for opportunism 
by the public and private contracting party.  
5.2.3.3  INSTITUTIONALIZED CONSENSUAL PROCESS (S.3) 
Constraints on the discretion of political and administrative actors may also be 
generated by an institutionalized process of argumentation and consensus formation. In 
the Jordanian water sector the stakeholders that were involved in decision-making were 
largely limited to the water sector entities (MWI, WAJ, PMU), other government 
ministries (such as the Ministry of Planning), donors (in particular the World Bank, 
KfW, USAID, European Investment Bank) and private sector representatives.201 NGOs, 
consumers and local authorities were not engaged to any significant extent.202 
Interviewees reported that although discussions at meetings sometimes aimed at 
concerted decisions, the committees’ structures were very hierarchical. Thus, positions 
that did not have the approval of the Minister of Water and Irrigation or the Secretary-
General of WAJ could not achieve a consensus.203  As a result, the decision-making 
process in water sector regulation did little to abate the potential for opportunism by 
political and top-administrative actors.  
5.2.3.4  SPECIFIC REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS (S.4) 
The potential for opportunism by the public and private contracting party may 
further be legally constrained by complex specific rules in the contract. It is important to 
notice that contract law unlike administrative law may not be legally altered without the 
sanction of the private contracting party. Thus, contract law is not necessarily affected 
by potentially unstable legislation through a lack of checks and balances.  
The water management contract did not stipulate any specific price-setting 
procedures as prices are set by the cabinet.204 Such an arrangement did not provide 
much room for opportunism from either party.  The private operator in a management 
contract does not rely on revenues for its compensation, but is paid an agreed 
management fee instead. With respect to the government, a cut in prices, although 
popular with the public, would have decreased the operational profit generated by 
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LEMA.  In fact price increases rather than decreases were targeted by WAJ during the 
contract period.205  
For the settlement of disputes, the contract specified three procedures. If a 
dispute arose the parties would first seek to resolve it by mutual consultation. If they 
failed to do so, the dispute would  then be referred to an Adjudicator. If either the WAJ 
or LEMA was dissatisfied with the Adjudicator’s decision, then arbitration would 
commence. Each party could appoint one arbitrator, while the two parties would jointly 
appoint a third arbitrator. The decision of a majority of arbitrators would be final and 
would be enforceable before any court.206 The stipulations show that the procedures 
constrained the potential for opportunism of both parties through clear rules for the 
resolution of disputes.  
To address possible problems of information asymmetry between the regulator 
and the operator the contract stipulated weekly and monthly meetings of the WAJ’s and 
the operator’s representatives. In addition, the operator had to issue monthly and annual 
reports, an annual budget, as well as additional reports upon request by WAJ.207 The 
PMU as the monitoring unit tracked 15 key indicators (drawn from the performance 
indicator agreement of the contract) on a quarterly and annual basis. An additional 
annual financial and technical audit report was prepared by external auditors funded by 
USAID.208 The reporting requirements therefore can be regarded as significant 
constraints on the discretion of the private operator.  
The contract further specified penalty provisions and performance incentives. At 
the end of each contract year an independent auditor issued a statement of operations on 
the performance of the private operator. The auditor was from an international firm that 
was selected and paid by the WAJ. Based on the statement, the WAJ calculated the 
performance incentive compensation (PIC) part of the contract. In case the operator 
failed to meet the performance standards, the WAJ was allowed to withhold payments 
and to deduct liquidated damages either from the fixed fee or from the PIC.209 The 
critical aspect of these contractual stipulations was that the independent auditor acted in 
a purely advisory function. The WAJ had the power to decide if the non-achievement of 
                                                 
205 Rothenberger, Dieter, 16.09.07 
206 cf. Water Authority of Jordan, 1999, General Conditions, p.9f. 
207 cf. Water Authority of Jordan, 1999, General Conditions, p.20ff. 
208 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.5 
209 cf. Water Authority of Jordan, 1999, General Conditions, p.40ff. 
 
 
 
 
  
68
the performance targets could be accredited to a failure of the operator or was due to 
other reasons. The power of WAJ to decide on this and to determine the amount of 
liquidated damages, provided the regulator with a significant scope for opportunism.210  
The examination of regulatory institutions in Jordan has shown that neither the 
administrative structure of the water sector, nor civil society monitoring, nor an 
institutionalized consensual process were able to sufficiently constrain the discretion of 
the public and private contracting party. While the latter two did not even qualify as 
nameable constraints, the administrative structure of the water sector left definite scope 
for arbitrary decisions and possible corrupt collaboration between political and 
administrative actors and the private operator.  Despite this, there is no doubt that 
specific regulatory constraints, associated with the contractual agreement and terms and 
conditions, did help to constrain the discretion of the contracting parties. This was 
because the degree to which the rule of law was established was satisfactory and 
consequently the contractual rules were enforceable by the courts. However, the  
presentation of the contractual rules has revealed that these rules may leave some scope 
for opportunism (as in the case of the penalty provisions). Moreover, contractual 
institutions may only confine what they have actually stipulated. However, as has been 
mentioned before, contracts are necessarily incomplete. The conclusion, therefore, is 
that the lack of political checks and balances was only partly compensated by the 
specific regulatory constraints. The following section will assess if international 
institutions played a part in constraining opportunistic behaviour by the contracting 
parties. 
5.2.4 International Institutions Affecting a PSP in the Water Sector 
5.2.4.1  SUBMISSION TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS (I.1) 
In addition to domestic institutions, international institutions may also place  
constraints on the discretion of the parties of a PSP. On 11th April 2000 Jordan was 
formally admitted as a member of the World Trade organization (WTO).211 By its 
association with the WTO, being a “legal and institutional foundation of the multilateral 
trading system”, the country submitted to major agreements such as the General 
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Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).212 GATS places obligations on its members 
regarding transparency, domestic regulations, business practices and so on. Another 
function of the WTO is to set rules and procedures for the settlement of disputes among 
its members.213 From 1989 onwards Jordan’s economic policies were strongly 
influenced by its request for financial support from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) of which Jordan is a member. Following the development of a structural 
adjustment programme, Jordan opened up capital markets, passed a new investment 
law, took steps towards privatization in the infrastructure sector, and modernized the 
transportation and communication infrastructure.214 In 1998, a study assessed the 
‘business friendliness’ of Middle Eastern countries and accredited Jordan the highest 
overall score (along with Lebanon).215 Following King Abdullah II’s accession to the 
throne in 1999, economic reforms were also accompanied, at least on paper, by political 
and administrative reforms. Between 1999 and 2005 the King announced a number of 
reform initiatives.  These included initiatives against corruption, to restructure the 
judiciary, to reform administration, to decentralize the kingdom, to empower the 
parliament, and to reform the electoral law.  However the effective implementation of 
the majority of these reforms still remains to be seen.216. The most comprehensive 
reform approach was the National Agenda of 2005/06, which renewed many earlier 
reform initiatives. However, few expect that this reform initiative will be any more 
successful than earlier efforts, largely because opposition and resistance from powerful 
groups in government and parliament is likely to be very strong.217 Nevertheless the 
King’s interest in international trade and investment remains strong. This is further 
demonstrated by Jordan’s engagement in the World Economic Forum (WEF), where 
Queen Rania of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a member of the foundation board. 
The regional initiative ‘WEF on the Middle East’ had its founding session in Jordan and 
more conferences by the WEF took place in Amman afterwards.218 
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Jordan’s obvious efforts to open up its economy and to encourage investments 
are a clear indication of the the government’s concern about its reputation with 
international investors. This concern and the legal liability of international economic 
institutions comprehensively constrained the potential for opportunism of political and 
administrative actors. The reason for this is that an exploitation of LEMA or other 
serious actions of opportunism would have diminished the willingness of international 
firms to invest in the country. Moreover, if, along with the opportunistic action,  
international economic institutions would have been violated, the government might 
have been subject to penalties. The infuence of international economic institutions was 
also felt by the private contracting party. For example, as Jordan is party to the GATS-
agreement of the WTO, private operators are also subject to the conditions and 
restrictions of such an agreement, with regard to such things as the stupulation of  
dispute resolution procedures, for example.  
5.2.4.2  INTERNATIONAL OR BILATERAL MONITORING (I.2) 
Restrictions on the discretion of the contracting parties may also stem from 
formal or informal international monitoring. International organizations or other 
governments that are providing loans or financial assistance are typically interested in 
how the money and assistance they provided is being used. Thus, they will engage in 
some kind of formal or informal monitoring. The Amman water management contract 
was – as mentioned before – financed by a World Bank loan and was embedded in the 
Amman Water and Sanitation Management Project (AWSMP) that involved further 
donors (USAID, KfW, EIB, Italy). In the project agreement on the AWSMP between 
the World Bank and the WAJ, the Bank laid down that WAJ shall “afford the Bank a 
reasonable opportunity to exchange views” on progress of project and WAJ 
performance and shall “promptly inform the Bank of any condition which interferes or 
threatens to interfere with the progress of the project”.219 In addition, copies of reports, 
work programs and budgets had to be furnished to the Bank.  Similar mechanisms 
applied with regard to the other donors of the AWSMP. Besides loans, financial 
assistance was also provided in the form of grants. The European Union (EU) financed 
the set-up and operation of the Programme Management Unit (PMU). One EU 
representative sat on the Executive Management Board of the PMU and was thus 
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involved in the decision-making process and the approval of annual operational 
plans.220 The finance agreement between the two parties determined that the 
responsibility of the EU was to monitor and audit the unit’s performance.221 Finally, the 
GTZ (German technical cooperation) provided technical assistance for the preparation 
of the contract. However, the agency was not involved into the implementation of the 
contract and thus did not have noticeable effect on the room for opportunism of the 
contracting parties.  
The donors that were involved in the transaction through financial assistance 
obviously monitored the performance of the contracting parties, but monitoring 
agreements existed only for the performance of the public side. Interviewees rated the 
influence of donors on the discretion of political and administrative actors as high. It 
was stated that if LEMA had encountered serious problems through opportunistic 
behaviour by its public partner, it could have turned to the World Bank. Furthermore, 
the view was advanced that donor pressure was a corner stone that was prevented 
arbitrary interference into the water sector. Without this kind of control, it was voiced, 
employees would not have been able to achieve their goals.222 
To conclude, Jordan’s status as a semi-rentier economy par excellence and its 
resulting strong dependence on international investments and rents generated significant 
commitment of political and administrative actors to the contract.223 Hence, 
international institutions considerably reduced the incentives and potential for 
opportunistic behaviour and made it very likely that the public partner was willing to 
cooperate with the private partner. 224 The discretion of the latter was also constrained 
by international institutions, yet to a minor extent than the public side. The constraints 
that influenced the private operator were on the one hand international economic 
institutions like the WTO regulations. On the other hand, the international awareness of 
the contract and of the performance of each party made it desirable for LEMA to show 
commitment in order to maintain a good international reputation.  
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5.2.5 The Institutional Framework in Jordan:  A Summary 
The examination of the institutional framework in Jordan has firstly revealed 
that the degree of the rule of law, although limited in some key respects, was 
nevertheless satisfactory for the requirements of the case under observation. However, 
the author only assessed the rule of law from the perspective of international investors. 
This study did not investigate if rule of law was also satisfactory from the perspective of 
the country’s citizens or local businesses. Moreover, judicial institutions were 
undoubtedly supplemented by international institutions, which enhanced the 
enforcement of specific constraints on opportunistic behaviour.  It can therefore be 
stated that judicial institutions were capable of enforcing both substantive restraints and 
restraints on system changes and that international institutions further enhanced the 
enforcement of specific constraints. That means that mechanism (c) of the study’s 
concrete hypothesis supported by the evidence.225 
With regard to the political institutions in Jordan it was found that political 
checks and balances were insufficient to stabilize the legislation for the water sector. In 
other words, formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory system were 
missing (mechanism (b) of the concrete hypothesis). This lack may be compensated by 
non-legislative constraints. However, neither civil society monitoring nor an 
institutionalized consensual process were effective in circumscribing the discretion of 
the contracting parties.  With regards to regulatory institutions (mechanism (a) in the 
concrete hypothesis), only the specific rules fixed by contract law were able to place  
constraints on the discretion of the contracting parties. The regulatory competence in the 
Jordanian water sector therefore can be seen as weak.  
Important constraints that were capable of safeguarding the PSP came from 
outside the country in the form of international economic institutions and international 
monitoring. However, this shows that opportunistic action is primarily constrained in 
situations where it becomes visible for international organizations. This is the case when 
it is either observable through monitoring or when opportunistic action prompts one of 
the parties to voice its complaints through arbitration or other means that make it public. 
It is assumed that the latter occurs whenever the opportunistic action is of a significant 
degree.  
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Before summing up the concrete potential for opportunism of each party, the 
relationship between the two parties can be recalled. The regulator in a management 
contract is generally in a stronger position than the operator, since the regulator has the 
power – no matter if justified or not – to withhold payments or to deduct liquidated 
damages. To obtain its right in case of unjustified penalties, the operator would need to 
go to arbitration or file a suit, which brings about costs. These costs also include costs 
for damages of the operator’s reputation, as legal disputes of a firm with a government 
may decrease the willingness of other governments to contract it, even when the firm 
wins the dispute. It is therefore likely that the operator will not take legal measures if 
the costs are higher than those that arise from the opportunistic action by the public 
party. 
With regard to the incentives and potential for opportunism of the private 
operator, the following could therefore be projected: The contractual rules placed quite  
strong constraints on the operator, as these rules were likely to be enforced through the 
existence of the rule of law and international constraints. Room for opportunism by the 
private operator remained, however, where the contract made no stipulations or where 
opportunism was not observable to the public party due to an information asymmetry.  
With regard to the incentives and potential for opportunism of political and 
administrative actors, the following could be projected from the institutional 
framework.  The discretion of political and administrative actors was mainly 
constrained by contractual rules, the existence of rule of law and international 
institutions. The irregularities in administrative law principally left much discretion to 
political and administrative actors, especially at top-management level. Hence, in this 
setting, room for opportunism remained, where no rules were stipulated and where the 
breach of contractual rules did not become visible to international agencies and did not 
prompt the operator to take measures that made the opportunistic action public.  
The previous sections of this chapter have discussed the potential for 
discretionary and opportunistic behaviour by one or both of the contracting parties.  The 
following section investigates the extent to which opportunistic action actually 
occurred, as well as whether administrative capabilities were sufficient so that 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were effective.  
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5.3 INTERMEDIARY VARIABLE: REGULATORY REGIME - 
 TRANSACTION SITUATION 
The previous examination of the institutional framework has shown that the 
incentives and potential for opportunistic behaviour were not fully constrained.  The 
projections that were made, based on the information about the institutional 
environment, will now be tested by scrutinizing the degree of occurrence of 
opportunistic behaviour of both parties and the effectiveness of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
5.3.1 Degree of Occurrence of Opportunistic Behaviour by Political - 
 Administrative Actors and the Private Operator (R.1) 
One incidence of opportunistic action may be a renegotiation of the contract that 
is pushed through by one of the contracting parties but is to the detriment of the other.  
Yet, some degree of renegotiation is desirable, as not all eventualities may be foreseen 
at the time of the set-up of the contract. Therefore, if renegotiations have occurred it is 
necessary to investigate their quality and impetus to find out if they are a matter of 
flexible adaptations or opportunistic renegotiations.226 In the case of the Amman MC 
after the audit of the first contract year, the parties recorded in a memorandum of 
understanding that “factors external to the contract [...] may have had an impact on the 
ability of LEMA to achieve certain contractual performance standards”.227 In a 
subsequent memorandum of understanding the PMU acknowledged that due to an 
inadequate net supply capacity of bulk water to the utility, the potential of LEMA to 
reduce the unaccounted-for-water and to improve the constancy of supply had been 
limited.228 Thus, it was amicably agreed to adjust the performance targets. This 
amendment can therefore be seen as a flexible adaptation to unexpected external 
problems and highly demanding performance standards.229 Other amendments to the 
contract stipulated its extension from four years to the final period of seven years and 
five months and additional tasks for LEMA with regard to the implementation of the 
Capital Investment Programme were added. But these also cannot be delineated as 
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opportunistic renegotiations as LEMA received additional compensation for its 
extended efforts. No further amendments or unilateral changes have been attempted.230  
With regard to contractual violations, it was found that no party sought 
arbitration or went to court. Still, one clear infringement of the contract occurred in 
connection with the seconded personnel that were released from their work at WAJ to 
work for LEMA. The contract had stipulated that LEMA was allowed to transfer 50% 
of the inherited personnel back to WAJ, and replace them by more qualified staff. Yet, 
after the first contract year when LEMA had returned 20% of the personnel, WAJ 
refused further staff transfers. The most likely reason for this is that the concerned staff 
lodged a protest with their patrons (i.e. the influential elite) against the procedure. 
Hence, the clientelistic network stopped LEMA from exercising its right, but 
nevertheless the private operator did not go to arbitration on this issue. In the following 
year LEMA removed most of the respective personnel, mainly through retirement, and 
hired new staff from the market.231  One interviewee was of the opinion that LEMA  
had most probably experienced further problems in terms of personnel decisions, due in 
the main to the effects of ‘Wasta’ and ‘clientelism’ that are inherent in Jordan’s 
bureaucracy,.232 This assumption was confirmed by another interviewee, who was 
informed about an incident in which one minister put pressure on LEMA to hire a 
number of the minister’s clients. It was said that subsequent to this move the minister 
overruled a decision by WAJ to deduct liquidated damages from LEMA’s 
compensation.233 From the side of the private operator no infringements of the contract 
were reported, and LEMA fulfilled its reporting requirements.234  
One incident that was not a clear breach of the contract but nevertheless induced 
a disagreement between the contracting parties was the delay of the capital investment 
programme (CIP). The contract envisaged that the programme for the rehabilitation and 
restructuring of the network ought to be finalized within the second contract year, but 
this stipulation was not binding.235 The same applied to the delivery of a customer 
information system. LEMA complained that the delay of these programmes affected its 
ability to achieve the contractual targets, such as the unaccounted-for-water target and 
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the accounts receivable target, as for example some rehabilitation was done in the 
network while LEMA was operating it.236 The delay itself actually did not constitute a 
form of opportunism by the public party, as it was not to its own advantage. However, 
the WAJ did not acknowledge that the operator’s performance was negatively affected 
by this time lag. In the before-mentioned memorandum of understanding on the revision 
of performance standards for the third contract year, it solely admitted a detrimental 
effect by an inadequate net supply capacity.237 In this connexion, the institutional 
arrangement that furnished the WAJ with the authority to calculate the performance 
incentive compensation (upon recommendation of an independent auditor) proved 
problematic. The power of WAJ to determine the reasons for the non-achievement of 
targets and the amount of liquidated damages, provided it with a significant 
discretion.238 Correspondingly, the partiality of WAJ in setting the liquidated damages 
gave rise to frictions.239  
Reportedly, especially in the first years of the contract, various other frictions 
occurred at those points, where the operator was dependent on the cooperation of the 
regulator, such as personnel and procurement.240 LEMA complained about the 
government’s mentality as well as long and tedious procedures in the cooperation with 
the public party.241 Interviewees argued that the regulator’s initial unaccommodating 
attitude to the contract most probably resulted from its lack of knowledge about what 
the chosen contract option was able to deliver, as well as the fact that it was not the 
government but the donors that had initiated the PSP.242 The opposition to the contract 
by some employees, who feared that they might lose their jobs,combined with an 
insufficiently constrained discretion of political and administrative actors, thus resulted 
in some opportunistic behaviour by the regulator, such as delays in the approval of 
billings handed in by LEMA. Repeated replacements by LEMA of its own top-
management may also indicate a problematic relationship with WAJ. However, this 
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situation improved after some time, when the PMU had taken up its work.  Regular 
meetings were established, which helped to ease the earlier tensions.243  
5.3.2 (In-) Effective Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanisms (R.2) 
The contract provided for ample monitoring and reporting requirements.244 
However, these were viewed, especially by LEMA, as being excessive and time-
consuming obligations.245 Notwithstanding this, interviewees reported that the 
monitoring procedures were not satisfactory in some areas, in particular in relation to 
the collection ratio, as the meter readers possessed an information monopoly. This 
information was important because the collection ratio partly determined the 
performance incentive compensation for the operator.  Over time, however, the problem 
was resolved through an increased automation in meter-reading through handheld-
units.246 Another opportunity for opportunism, this time for LEMA, was the fact that 
during the first year of the contract, when the PMU had not been fully established, no 
monitoring took place.247 However, there is no evidence that the operator took 
advantage of this opportunity for opportunistic behaviour.  
The administrative capabilities of the PMU as the monitoring unit were initially 
quite weak, as the unit had been newly set up and as its personnel had little experience 
with respect to the required tasks. However, this initial lack was mostly outweighed by 
the engagement of external auditors for the annual review of the operator’s 
performance. Thus, no major imbalance came about between the regulator and the 
operator.248 The enforcement of the contract has been largely effective as the incentive 
payments and penalties were sufficient instruments to achieve compliance by LEMA.249 
It has to be conceded that the reported incidents of opportunism give only an 
idea of the degree of opportunistic behaviour that has actually taken place during the 
contract period.  The causes for this lie within the nature of the forms of opportunistic 
behaviour that were insufficiently constrained by the institutional framework. It was 
projected that opportunism by the operator was likely especially in those areas, where 
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the public party could not observe it. This lack of transparency occurred with regard to 
the first contract year, when no monitoring took place, with respect to the collection 
ratio. However, due to its unobservability by the regulator and international 
organizations, no other information about incidents of opportunism by LEMA could be 
obtained. With regard to opportunistic behaviour by the public partner, the state of 
information was better. It was projected from the institutional framework that 
opportunistic action by the public party could occur when it was not visible to 
international organizations and was not of a degree upon which LEMA would decide to 
take measures that make it public. This assumption was confirmed by the reported 
incidents of opportunism. One clear infringement of the contract concerning the transfer 
of personnel did not prompt LEMA to go to arbitration.  Another incident, the far-
reaching clientelism by one minister, was apparently reciprocated by the cancellation of 
liquidated damages. Further concrete opportunistic action could not be named, yet it 
was stated that in the first contract years, WAJ was not cooperative and the relation 
between the contracting parties was affected by frictions, especially regarding the 
incentive payments.  
In summary, opportunistic behaviour in the Amman Management Contract was 
of a hidden nature. This is coherent with what was predicted from the institutional 
framework: namely, that no widely observable opportunistic action would arise, but that 
the weak regulatory framework still left significant room for opportunism by both the 
public and private partners.  The following section evaluates the performance of the 
private operator, following which the thesis will be summarized and the validity of the 
asserted hypotheses will be assessed.   
5.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY 
 OPERATED WATER UTILITY 
The Programme Management Unit tracked 15 indicators as key targets.  
Performance against these is summarised and analysed below. 
 The constancy of water supply was increased from 8 hours on average per week 
to 36 hours per week in peak season and 48 hours in off-peak season, thus fulfilling the 
revised performance target (Target 1).  This increase was achieved despite the influx of 
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a large number of refugees from Iraq and an insubstantial increase in bulk supplies.250 A 
clear delivery schedule, moreover, produced certainty for the customers.251 The water 
quality was improved from a good quality to a very high standard and remained stable 
on a level exceeding the MWI’s quality standards.252  
To improve inefficient customer services and public information, the operator 
established and operated a state-of-the-art computerized customer call centre (Target 2), 
which was widely praised.253  In addition, the operator set up three regional repair and 
maintenance shops with a 24-hour service.254 This enabled LEMA to reduce the 
response time for repairs of water and sewerage malfunctions to 1.6 hours, thus 
exceeding the agreed target of 6 hours (Target 3).255 
Staff productivity was increased from 5.6 to 3.4 staff per thousand water 
accounts, thus exceeding the agreed target of 4.0 (Target 4).  The network was digitally 
mapped to 100% (Target 5), a hydraulic computer model was developed and staff 
trained in its use (Target 6), and a computerized information system was developed and 
operated (Target 7) Operating and maintenance procedures were improved to 
international standards (Target 8) and 250,000 water meters were renewed, exceeding 
the target of 200,000 Target 9). A digitally-based leak detection and repair program was 
implemented and well run (Target 10), and a preventive maintenance programme was 
successfully completed (Target 11).256  
Assessment problems occurred with regard to two targets. Concerning energy 
consumption, an energy management plan was submitted as obliged (Target 12), but the 
reduction of power consumption could not be meaningfully measured due to external 
factors out of the control of the operator. The evaluation of the reduction in the number 
of breakdown repairs in the water network (Target 13) was also not feasible as the 
indicator was fine-tuned later and received a different base year. Moreover, the target 
can be questioned, as it was likely that repairs would increase in the short- and medium-
term because of an improved constancy of supply and “in a situation where improved 
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customer service and public information campaigns [encouraged] customers to report 
leaks and malfunctions”.257 
The operator failed to achieve one of the primary targets (Target 14), a reduction 
in the percentage of unaccounted-for-water (UFW). This was originally supposed to be 
reduced from 54% to 29%. In a memorandum of understanding the target was revised to 
40%, but LEMA accomplished only a reduction of 42% on average. However, to 
LEMA’s defence it should be said that in those districts where the network and 
metering had been upgraded a reduction to 35% was achieved, and in some pilot 
districts where continuous water supply was realized, the UFW was reduced to 23%.258 
The operator further failed to achieve the target (Target 15) for the collection of 
accounts receivables (in terms of days of average daily billing) from 269 days to 73 
days.259 The actual reduction achieved was only to 217 days. This failure was partly due 
to a number of extremely old accounts, which according to Jordanian law may not be 
written off even though the chance of ever collecting them is small.260   
To conclude, at the end of the contract LEMA complied substantially with 11 of 
15 key performance targets, whereas two targets could not be meaningfully assessed. 
Distinct improvements were achieved in commercial and administrative respects. Also 
the technical operations have been improved to some extent. The targets for the 
reduction of UFW and accounts receivables were missed, but one can argue that they 
had been set based on questionable estimates, as the inability of the government to 
guarantee sufficient bulk supply made water supply intermittent and extremely old 
accounts could not be written off. Apart from that, the operator fulfilled all its 
obligations and was successful in achieving the goals of the contract, which aimed at an 
increase in efficiency in terms of increased profitability. The incentive for an efficiency 
increase was set through the performance incentive compensation (PIC), which was 
contingent on revenue optimization, improved collection efficiency and cost control. 
LEMA managed to increase the operational profit from annual losses of approx. 2.7 
million Jordanian Dinar (JD)261 before the implementation of the PSP to an annual 
                                                 
257 World Bank, 2007, p.8 
258 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.6 
259 The target of 269 days was revised in a later memorandum of understanding, but no reliable information could be 
obtained on the new target. 
260 cf. World Bank, 2007, p.8 
261 Currency equivalents (effective 12.02.2007): JD 1.00 = US$ 1.41; US$ 1.00 = JD 0.71 (World Bank, 2007, p.1) 
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profit of about 13.7 million JD.262 The operator received PICs for each year of the 
contract. The overall judgement on LEMA’s performance therefore may be rated as 
good. The following chapter provides a summary of this study, draws conclusions about 
the validity of the hypotheses and the explanatory power of the theoretical framework, 
and provides some final considerations with respect to PSPs in the water sector. 
                                                 
262 cf. Programme Management Unit, 2007 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
This study aimed at investigating the impact of institutional frameworks on 
private sector participation in water supply and sanitation. For this purpose it was firstly 
outlined how the concept of institutions is related to water governance and 
development. It was found that institutions form the framework by which authority is 
exercised in a country and that this framework is linked to governance outcomes. The 
demonstrated positive externalities of a sufficient, reliable and safe water supply made 
clear how important it is for the social and economic development of a country that 
governments address the shortcomings in water governance. The need to improve water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) under public service provision led to the promotion of 
private sector participation. Recent developments show that the mixed experience with  
private provision has brought about an increase of low-risk rather than larger-scale and 
high-risk PSP arrangements.  
In the course of this work, an overview was provided of the research that has 
been carried out on the determinants of performance of PSPs in infrastructure provision 
and services. Four levels of analysis were identified: the level of resource allocation and 
employment (drawn primarily from neoclassical economics and agency theory); the 
level of governance (drawn from transaction cost analysis); the level of the institutional 
environment (drawn from new institutional economics and positive political theory); 
and the level of institutional embeddedness (drawn from social theory). As the level of 
neoclassical economics and the agency theory was found to be incapable of explaining 
the experienced malfunctions of PSP arrangements, and institutional embeddedness is 
often taken as given (as norms and traditions can hardly be shaped deliberately), the 
focus was on the middle two levels. On the third level, the transaction cost approach by 
Williamson points out that the performance of a PSP in terms of its transaction cost 
efficiency depends on the degree of a fit or misfit between the characteristics of a 
transaction and its chosen governance structure. The approaches that were introduced 
for the second level included political economy theory as well as the new institutional 
economics. Baietti, Kingdom and Ginneken find that a significant degree of autonomy 
and balanced accountabilities of a utility are important conditions for good performance. 
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Rufin and Romero identify both political and institutional factors as determinants of 
performance, namely resources, capabilities, as well as institutional structures and the 
problem of ‘time inconsistency in public policy’. The NIE theories of the second level 
which are based on the transaction cost economics have shifted the focus from the ‘play 
of the game’ to the ‘rules of the game’. They find that the institutional environment of a 
transaction has an impact on its cost and performance. The overview of the existing 
literature showed a lack of research regarding the role of the institutional environment 
in general and PSP in the water sector specifically and moreover was biased towards 
approaches explaining mainly the performance of high-risk arrangements. To contribute 
to filling this gap the derived research question was how far the institutional 
environment in a country affects the performance of a privately operated water utility. 
The NIE approach that was best suited for the methods and scope of this study, though 
with some additions and modifications, was the approach by Levy and Spiller which 
focused on how the institutional environment affects the opportunity for opportunism 
and manipulation by the public and private partners in a PSP arrangement, with obvious 
implications for the efficient and effective performance of the contract.  
Having introduced the concept of institutions, Levy and Spiller’s framework was 
presented in detail. They find that three complementary mechanisms are necessary to 
restrain opportunism by the public side: (a) substantive restraints on regulatory 
discretion, (b) formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory system and (c) 
institutions that enforce both substantive restraints and restraints on system changes. As 
this view inadequately narrowed the analysis on contractual distortions initiated by the 
public contracting partner, the framework was adapted to also take into account the 
impact of institutions on the potential for opportunism by the private partner. 
Furthermore the approach was expanded to include not only national judicial, political 
and regulatory institutions, but also international institutions. Thereafter the hypothesis 
and sub-hypotheses were introduced, which suggested that the performance of a 
privately operated water utility will be negatively affected, if the discretion of the 
contracting parties is not sufficiently constrained by the institutional environment. 
In a next step the chosen case study of the management contract in Amman, 
Jordan was justified. The research methodology was presented, setting out the research 
questions for the case study, data needs and indicators for the independent, intermediary 
and dependent variable as well as the methods of data collection and data processing. 
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An overview on Jordan’s political, economic and social situation, the Jordanian water 
sector and the pre-privatization situation along with the Amman Management Contract 
provided the background information for the subsequent findings and interpretations. 
The section on the management contract moreover explained what kind of incentive 
structure resulted from the chosen governance structure and the specific transaction 
situation. The examination of the institutional framework revealed that it was mainly  
judicial and international institutions and specific contract rules that constrained the 
discretion of the contracting parties. Political checks and balances were insufficiently 
established and the remaining regulatory institutions left room for opportunism. From 
the assessment of the institutional framework it was thus projected that opportunistic 
action by the private operator could occur in areas for which the contract made no 
stipulations or where such behaviour was not observable to the public party. 
With regard to the public party it was projected that opportunism could occur in 
areas where no contractual rules were stipulated, where the breach of contractual rules 
would not become visible to international agencies and would not prompt the operator 
to take measures that make the opportunistic action public. These projections were 
confirmed by the assessment of the occurrence of opportunistic behaviour and the 
effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. No opportunistically 
motivated renegotiation took place, nor did any contractual violations occur that 
induced one party to seek arbitration or to go to court. Still, clear incidents of 
opportunism by political and administrative actors were reported with regard to 
personnel decisions, but these were not made public and thus were not well known to 
most interview partners. Furthermore, the institutional framework gave rise to frictions 
on the working level as in the case of the calculation of the Performance Incentive 
Compensation (PIC) by the Water Authority of Jordan, as well as the non-cooperation 
of the public side in the early years of the contract.  If the room for opportunism by the 
private partner was also exploited by it, this could not be could not be verified as no 
sources or interview partners were available that could have reported such incidents. 
The assessment of the dependent variable showed that the performance of the privately 
operated water utility was good, as eleven of fifteen key targets were fulfilled, whereas 
two targets could not be meaningfully assessed. The goal to increase the efficiency and 
the operational profit was also attained. Whilst LEMA failed to comply with the targets 
for unaccounted-for-water (UFW) and accounts receivables, it can be argued that they 
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had been set on questionable estimates and their achievement was among other things 
hampered by an insufficient bulk supply and the legal prescription that prohibits old 
accounts to be written off.  
Based on the findings of the previous chapter, we can now turn, by way of 
conclusion, to an assessment of the extent to which the assumptions of the hypotheses 
set out in Chapter 2 can be verified by the case of the Management Contract for Water 
and Wastewater Services in the Amman Governorate. It is obviously acknowledged that 
a single case-study of this kind cannot conclusively prove or disprove such hypotheses, 
but it is nevertheless felt that valuable research lessons may still be learned. 
Sub-Hypothesis 1: Weak performance (i.e. operator’s failure to fulfil obligations and to attain goals and 
targets set in the contract) arises, when judicial institutions are incapable of enforcing both substantive 
restraints and restraints on system changes and when there are no international institutions that are able 
to compensate for this lack, and thus an opportunistic behaviour of political/administrative actors and the 
private operator is likely.  
 
Sub-hypothesis 1 does not apply to the Amman Water case, as judicial 
institutions have been found to sufficiently constrain substantive restraints and restraints 
on system changes from the perspective of international investors. In addition, 
international institutions are able to limit the discretion of the actors.  
Sub-Hypothesis 2: Weak performance arises, when – despite the existence of rule of law – the checks and 
balances are not sufficient to prevent legislative changes of the regulatory system and sufficient 
commitment is not secured through informal constraints or an institutionalized consensual process or 
contract law or international institutions.  
 
Sub-hypothesis 2 does not apply as the lack of checks and balances was found to 
be (at least regarding major and visible opportunistic action) compensated by the 
contract and international institutions.  
Sub-Hypothesis 3: Weak performance arises, when – despite the existence of the rule of law or 
constraining international institutions, and – despite sufficient checks and balances that legally restrain 
system changes, the regulatory process is not written in administrative law (juridification of the water 
sector) or in the contract (through specific regulatory constraints) and thus opportunistic behaviour of 
political/administrative actors and the private operator is likely.   
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Sub-hypothesis 3 also does not apply as one of the preconditions, namely 
“sufficient checks and balances”, was found to be insufficient. The non-applicability of 
these sub-hypotheses helps to explain why no weak performance has arisen from the 
institutional framework in Jordan. Still, the concrete hypothesis projected that an 
improper establishment of the three mechanisms (a), (b) and (c) would leave potential 
for opportunism by the contracting parties, which could negatively affect the 
performance of the utility.  
Concrete hypothesis: If, (a) substantive restraints (regulatory institutions) on regulatory discretion, and 
(b) formal or informal restraints on changing the regulatory system, and (c) institutions that enforce both 
the substantive restraints and restraints on system changes are properly established, the potential for 
manipulation or exploitation by political and administrative actors and by the private operator is low, 
and thus the institutional framework will not negatively affect the performance of a privately operated 
utility.  
 
It was also assumed that a lack in some institutions may be compensated by 
other constraints if a number of them were established. In Jordan, a lack of effective 
checks and balances was discovered. This lack was neither constrained by informal 
constraints or an institutionalized consensual process. The only institutions that 
effectively placed constraints on the discretion of political and administrative actors 
were the contract and international institutions.  
What is important to realize is that the problem in Jordan was not only the 
instability of regulation that resulted from the lack of checks and balances. The 
regulation of the water sector itself, i.e. its administrative structure, was also improperly 
established. The unclear allocation of responsibilities left significant discretion to 
individual actors especially at the top level. That this discretion was sometimes used in 
an opportunistic way was indicated by the reported incidents.  However, in Jordan, the 
‘pursuit of self-interest’ did not occur in terms of a joint opportunism by the personnel 
of a water sector entity to the advantage of the entity or the sector as a whole, which has 
sometimes been the case in other countries.  Opportunistic action was rather pursued by 
single actors to their own advantage. As such kind of opportunism needs to be pursued 
in a more or less hidden way, the actors needed to make sure that it was not made public 
by the partner. This may have been reached, as in one of the cases outlined above, by 
compensating the private partner through the PIC incentive scheme.   
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I have therefore come to the conclusion that the general hypothesis could neither 
be denied nor clearly confirmed by the case study. This is because, despite the lacks of 
constraints on opportunistic behaviour, the performance of the privately operated water 
utility was satisfactory (in terms of meeting most of the targets set out in the contract).  
There is also little evidence to suggest that the two targets that were not reached would 
have been achieved without the incidents of opportunism.  From a developmental 
perspective the Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Services in the 
Amman Governorate can be rated as a success. The total amount of PICs combined with 
the total amount of fixed fees paid to the operator was less than 15 million Jordanian 
Dinar (or 18 million Euros).  This means, that the profit created by the contract was 
substantially higher than its costs.  Additional finance was also provided for the 
rehabilitation of the network. With regard to the whole Amman Water and Sanitation 
Management project, which also included the Capital Investment Programme, the 
World Bank rated the efficiency of the project as high.263 The financial burden on the 
government was reduced as the cost-recovery was significantly improved. The impact 
of the project on the poor was also positive. The rise in water connections from about 
90% to practically 100% was of particular benefit to the poor, as they are usually “the 
last to be connected to piped water”.264 The same applied to sewer connections which 
increased from 69% to 80% of the population.265 The increase of the hours of supply is 
also of relevance for the poor as these can afford only smaller water tanks to store water 
when the supply is intermittent.266 The increase in the quality of drinking water reduces 
the health risk of the population, but again disproportionately benefits the poor as these 
have less economic means to pay for alternative and safer drinking water sources. 
However, in terms of the sustainability of the project the success has to be rated as 
lower. This is because the water supply and sanitation systems in Amman remain 
dependent on foreign financing of its investments.267 Furthermore, “urban water 
demand is projected to almost double by 2020”.268 The demographic development will 
be a big challenge for a country where scarce water resources allow already only for an 
unsatisfactory bulk supply capacity. 
                                                 
263 World Bank, 2007, p.9 
264 Ringskog, Klas; Hammond, Mary Ellen; Locussol, Alain, 2006, p.2 
265 World Bank, 2007, p.9 
266 Rothenberger, Dieter, 16.09.07 
267 World Bank, 2007, p.18 
268 Meuss, Marina; Stoll, Uwe; Barmeier, Nina, 2006, p. 4 
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Despite the successes of the water management contract, it is nevertheless likely 
that the opportunism regarding the operator’s human resources still had a limiting effect 
on its performance as some personnel were not as qualified as they could have been if 
they had been recruited competitively from the market. Also some frictions could have 
been avoided by assigning the authority for the calculation and definition of the PIC to 
an independent auditor. Finally, the projections made from the assessment of the 
institutional framework have been confirmed by the actual incidents of opportunism. 
This suggests that the general hypothesis contains some truth.  
However, with regard to the explanatory power of the theoretical framework 
some limitations need to be acknowledged. Some aspects were found to have a 
detrimental effect on the PSP arrangement could not be adequately analyzed through  
new institutional economics approaches. For example, the non-cooperation of 
administrative actors with the private operator in the first years of the contract was 
attributable in part to their lack of awareness of what the chosen contract option was 
supposed to accomplish,  and in part to the fact that the PSP was to a significant extent a 
result of pressure by donors. Thus, opportunistic behaviour in form of non-cooperation 
(e.g. by unnecessarily slowing down administrative processes) neither originated from 
an insufficiently constrained discretion, nor could this behaviour have been adequately 
constrained by institutions. At such points the political economy theories are better 
suited to provide explanations and solutions for factors that have a detrimental effect on 
PSP arrangements. 
In addition, with respect to the transferability of the findings of the case study to 
other PSPs in other countries some limitations remain. International institutions have 
played an extremely important role in Jordan, which cannot necessarily be presumed to 
be the case for other developing countries. Due to its lack of national resources and a 
weak economy, Jordan is highly dependent on international rents and investments and 
cannot risk putting off donors and international investors. This means, that even if a 
country is submitted to comparable international economic institutions and the PSP 
under observation is financed internationally, this does not necessarily mean that these 
institutions have a similar constraining effect on the discretion of the contracting parties. 
Moreover it needs to be acknowledged that in Jordan despite an insufficient separation 
of powers and a lack of political checks and balances, much of the unrestrained 
discretion was limited to the king. Consequently, this setting provided some stability, as 
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the king’s policies regarding international rents and investments are unlikely to change 
as long as the country has the status of a semi-rentier economy.  
Not only is the transferability of the findings to other countries limited. Also 
with regard to other PSP arrangements in Jordan that do not involve international 
companies and are not financed internationally, the institutional framework looks very 
different. Without the impact of international institutions on the discretion of the actors, 
the administrative structure and proceedings may give rise to a significant commitment 
problem by the public side. These examples show that the concrete findings are not 
easily transferable, but rather that for each transaction the specific situation of a country 
and the particular institutional framework needs to be assessed.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the chosen PSP option can make an important  
difference. In high-risk arrangements the incentives for opportunism are higher and the 
lock-in of the contracting parties is stronger so that the discretion of the actors needs to 
be more thoroughly restrained. For Jordan, under the outlined institutional framework, it 
is doubtful if a higher-risk arrangement, such as a concession, would have performed as 
effectively as a management contract.  This can be assumed because of the weak 
regulatory framework and the opportunities for political interference into the sector. 
Likewise it is doubtful if Jordan could attract larger-scale and higher-risk investments 
under the present institutional environment. This assumption is further supported by the 
behaviour that bidders in the case of the Amman Management Contract. Although a 
management contract already possesses a limited potential for opportunistic action and 
although the fixed fee and the PIC was financed by the World Bank (thus adding to the 
security of the compensation), the various bidders decided to bid for a very low 
performance incentive component (PIC).  Another indication for the risk aversion of 
private operators in Jordan is that a tendered management contract for the Northern 
Governorates received only one bid. After being replaced by a Management Consultant 
Contract, for which the risk tends to zero, the contract received many bids.269  
While the presented theoretical framework was designed to be applicable to 
various countries and PSP arrangements, the case study suggests that specific findings 
(related in particular to issues such as the role of international institutions) cannot be 
transferred easily to other countries. This is because the institutions may not be seen as 
                                                 
269 Dahiyat, Iyad, 29.10.07 
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independent building blocks but rather form a network which is likely to be unique for 
each country. The application of the framework to other countries and PSP 
arrangements therefore demands each time a complex assessment of the respective 
institutional environment. However, this case study provides one important insight 
which may be generalized.  This is that regulatory credibility may be developed even in 
unpropitious circumstances and environments.270 In Jordan a relatively good 
performance was achieved despite the incomplete independence of the judiciary, despite 
a lack of checks and balances and despite quite a weak a weak regulatory framework. 
To be able to increase the chance for the good performance of a planned arrangement, it 
is advantageous for governments to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their 
own institutional environment. When governments are aware of these aspects they are 
able to choose either a PSP option for which the institutional framework brings about 
sufficient constraints or to adapt the institutional environment in a way that it may 
sufficiently restrain the desired PSP option.  
According to the findings of this study, the decision of the government to 
transfer the operation of the water supply and sanitation in Amman after the end of the 
LEMA contract to a public company (called Miyahuna) seems risky. While the 
government’s argument that its inability to guarantee bulk water supply would indicate 
a necessary reversal from the path towards higher-risk PSP may be justified, the 
institutional framework, I would argue, needs to be rethought if the public company is 
to perform effectively.  Admittedly, unlike the situation that prevailed before the LEMA 
contract (when water and sanitation services were centrally managed), Miyahuna will  
operate on a commercial basis and will be provided with a more transparent governance 
structure. However, for this new public company, the strong constraining effect of 
international institutions will probably cease to apply. During the LEMA contract,  such 
institutions had been important constraints on opportunistic behavious, in a country 
where the judiciary is not completely independent, where checks and balance are nearly 
non-existent and where the regulatory framework is weak. Whether or not a public 
water company, which is owned, financed and operated by Jordanian nationals – and 
consequently lacks the constraining effect of international institutions – can protect 
itself against the influences of ‘Wasta’ and clientelism therefore remains to be seen.   
                                                 
270 cf. Levy, Brian; Spiller, Pablo T., 1994, p.201 
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‘Wasta’ as a structural feature of Jordan’s political, social and economic system is a key 
obstacle to regulatory credibility in Jordan since with the aid of ‘wasta’ institutions may 
be bypassed and legal frameworks may be influenced.271 But the “reliance on personal 
relationships is less a reflection of tradition than it is a result of the novelty and 
instability of formal, impersonal institutions and relations”.272 Thus, ‘wasta’ should not 
be regarded as a feature that is inherent to the Jordanian culture, but rather as a vestige 
of a society that has been organized in a different way. Making institutions reliable and 
stable is the responsibility of politics, whereas the royal court itself hampers this 
development by allowing such things as elite rotation to hold on to its power. This 
creates an obvious dilemma for the regime, as the conservation of its power through the 
sustainment of the loyalty of politically influential groups could well be at odds with the  
economic and social development of the country.273  
 
 
                                                 
271 cf. Loewe, Markus, 2007, p.146 
272 Dieterich, Renate, 1999, p.132 
273 cf. Loewe, Markus, 2007, p.142 
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ANNEXES 
Annex I: Variables, Indicators and Measurements 
TABLE 1: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
“INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT” 
Independent variable Indicators Measurements 
Ju
di
ci
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Existence of rule of 
law 
J.1Independence  
of the judiciary 
• Appointment of judges does not lie in the sole 
responsibility of the executive 
• Extent of perceived corruption in the judiciary 
• Occurrence of former courts’ decisions against  the 
government 
J.2 Protection of 
property rights • Tradition of efficiently upholding property rights  
Po
lit
ic
al
 
in
st
itu
tio
ns
 
Legal constraints on 
the discretion of the 
executive 
Po.1 Checks and 
Balances 
• Existence of a constitution 
• Full separation of powers 
• Two legislative houses elected under different 
voting rules 
• Electoral system with proportional representation 
• Federalism with strong decentralization 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
in
sti
tu
tio
ns
 
Administrative 
constraints on the 
discretion of public 
and private 
contracting parties 
S.1 Proper 
juridification of the 
water sector 
• Existence of specialized government agencies for 
the regulation of the water sector 
• Clear responsibility assignment among regulating 
agencies in the water sector 
• Autonomy of the regulator 
Informal constraints 
on the discretion of 
public and private 
contracting parties 
S.2 Informal (civil) 
society monitoring 
• Degree to which the civil society is organized  
• Degree to which the civil society is consulted as a 
stakeholder 
• Coverage and discussion of water sector policies 
and outcomes in the press 
• Realization of public awareness campaigns by 
public or private contracting party 
• Resignations of politicians from office as a 
consequence to malfunctions in the water sector in 
the past  
Process constraints 
on the discretion of 
the public contracting 
party 
S.3 Institutiona-
lized consensual 
processes 
• Institutionalized process of argumentation and 
consensus formation in the water sector regulation 
Specific regulatory 
constraints on the 
discretion of public 
and private 
contracting parties 
S.4 Specific 
regulatory 
constraints 
• Complex specific rules for the water sector (price-
setting procedures, conflict resolution procedures, 
arbitration mechanisms, monitoring systems, 
penalty provisions, performance incentives) 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
  
 
International 
constraints on the 
discretion of the 
public and private 
contracting party 
 
 
I.1 Submission to 
international 
economic 
institutions
• Application for, or membership in international 
economic organizations 
• Policies favouring foreign investment and trade 
I.2 International or 
bilateral 
monitoring 
• Loans from development organizations for the 
transaction which involve monitoring  
• Other international/ bilateral involvement in the 
transaction which entails (in)formal monitoring 
(such as technical assistance) 
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TABLE 2: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR THE INTERMEDIARY VARIABLE 
“REGULATORY REGIME (TRANSACTION SITUATION)” 
Intermediary variable Indicators Measurements 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
re
gi
m
e/
 T
ra
ns
ac
tio
n 
si
tu
at
io
n 
Incentives and 
potential of 
political/administrative 
actors and the private 
operator 
to manipulate or 
exploit the contract 
R.1 Degree of 
occurrence of 
opportunistic 
behaviour by 
political/administrative 
actors and the private 
operator 
• (No) Push for renegotiation of the contract 
by either side 
• (No) Unilateral changes of the contract by 
political/administrative actors 
• (No) Attempts by political/administrative 
actors to unilaterally change the contract 
• (No) Contractual violations by either side 
• (No) Failure by private operator to report 
regularly and properly to the regulator 
• Quality of disagreements between 
political/admin. actors and the private 
operator 
R.2 (In-) Effective  
monitoring and 
enforcement  
• (In-)Sufficient mechanisms to overcome 
information asymmetries 
• (In-)Sufficient administrative capabilities to 
properly monitor the operator and to apply 
stipulated enforcement mechanisms 
 
 
TABLE 3: INDICATORS AND MEASUREMENTS FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
“PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY OPERATED WATER UTILITY” 
Dependent variable Indicators Measurements 
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 p
riv
at
el
y 
op
er
at
ed
 u
til
ity
 Operator’s success/ 
failure to fulfil 
obligations and to 
attain goals and 
targets set in the 
contract 
 
Pf.1 (Non-) 
Compliance of 
results with 
contractual 
obligations, goals 
and targets at the 
end of the contract 
 
 
• Comparison of obligations/ goals/ targets stated in 
the contract with output/ outcome of the 
transaction  
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Annex II: Interview Partners 
Ali, Nabeel B. 
National Democratic Institute, Jordan office, Resident Programme Assistant 
05 November 2007 
 
Bröning, Michael 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Resident Representative 
22 October 2007 
 
Dahiyat, Iyad Eng. 
Programme Management Unit (PMU), Governorate Support Manager 
29 October 2007, 01 November 2007 
 
De Winter, Annemie 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Director 
05 November 2007 
 
Meuss, Marina 
GTZ (German technical cooperation), Interim Programme Manager 
Water Programme, Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
01 November 2007 
 
Oweis, Munir 
Programme Management Unit (PMU), Director 
(Former employee of LEMA) 
19 September 2007 
 
Rothenberger, Dieter 
GTZ (German technical cooperation), Programme Manager  
Operations Management Support for the Middle Governorates, Water Authority of Jordan 
16 September 2007 
 
Zoubi, Kamal Eng. 
Miyahuna, Jordan Water Company, Chief Executive Officer 
(Public Water Company – successor of LEMA) 
17 September 2007 
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Annex III: Interview Questions Addressed to Political Foundations 
and NGOs 
 
 
 
 
Research Question: In how far does the institutional framework in a country, composed of its 
political, judicial, international and regulatory institutions, affect the performance of a privately 
operated water utility? 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Judicial Institutions: Existence of rule of law 
J.1 Independence of the judiciary 
1. What are the mechanisms for appointing judges? 
2. What is the extent of perceived corruption in the judiciary? 
3. Have the courts repeatedly decided against the government? 
4. Would you regard the judiciary as being independent? 
 
J.2 Protection of property rights 
1. Is there a tradition of efficiently upholding property rights? 
 
Political Institutions: Legal constraints on the discretion of the executive 
Po.1 Checks and balances 
1. Does a constitution exist? 
2. Are the legislative, executive and judicial powers fully separated? 
3. Is the legislative bicameral, and if yes have the two legislative houses been elected under 
different voting rules? 
4. Does the electoral system demand proportional representation or a first-past-the-post rule? 
5. Is the state federally structured and strongly decentralized? 
6. Would you regard the checks and balances as constraining factors for legislative changes of the 
regulatory system in the water sector? 
 
International Institutions:  
International constraints on the discretion of the public contracting party 
I.1 Submission to international economic institutions 
1. Has Jordan applied for, or is member in international economic organizations? 
2. Are economic policies favouring or restricting foreign investment and trade? 
3. Would you regard international economic institutions as constraining factors upon the potential 
of political and administrative actors to behave opportunistically in interactions with private 
business? Do you think it also constrains the discretion of the private contracting party? 
The Impact of Institutional Frameworks on Private Sector Participation 
 
- The Case of the Management Contract for  
Water and Wastewater Services in the Amman Governorate, Jordan – 
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Annex IV: Interview Questions Addressed to Water and Privatization 
Experts and the Relevant Personnel in the Government 
 
 
 
Research Question: In how far does the institutional framework in a country, composed of its 
political, judicial, international and regulatory institutions, affect the performance of a privately 
operated water utility? 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Regulatory institutions:  
Substantive constraints on the discretion of public and private contracting parties: 
S.1 Administrative constraints: Proper juridification of the water sector 
1. Which specialized government agencies are involved in the regulation of the water sector? 
2. Are responsibilities clearly assigned among them?  
3. Is the regulator autonomous? 
4. Do you consider the water sector as properly juridificated, i.e. are regulatory mechanisms 
sufficient and effective? If not, which improvements would you recommend? 
5. Do you think that the mentioned constraints abate the potential for opportunism of public and/ or 
private contracting party? 
 
S.2 Informal constraints: Informal (civil) society monitoring 
1. What was the degree of public interest in the quality of water and wastewater services? 
2. To which degree was the civil society organized? 
3. Has the civil society been consulted as a stakeholder? 
4. Have water sector policies and outcomes been covered and discussed in the press? 
5. Have public awareness campaigns on the developments in the water sector been realized by the 
public and/ or private contracting party? 
6. Have politicians in the past resigned from office as a consequence to malfunctions in the water 
sector? 
7. Do you think that informal (civil) society monitoring abates the potential for opportunism of 
public and/ or private contracting party? 
S.3 Process constraints: Institutionalized consensual process 
1. Is there an institutionalized process of argumentation and consensus formation in the water 
sector regulation? If yes, do you think that it abates the potential for opportunism of the public 
contracting party? 
 
S.4 Specific regulatory constraints: Complex specific rules 
1. Which complex rules do exist for the regulation of the water sector (e.g. price-setting 
procedures, conflict resolution procedures, arbitration mechanisms, monitoring systems, penalty 
provisions, performance incentives)?  
2. Do you think that any regulations, that should have been established, are lacking?   
The Impact of Institutional Frameworks on Private Sector Participation 
 
- The Case of the Management Contract for Water and Wastewater Services 
 in the Amman Governorate, Jordan –
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3. Do you think that these rules abate the potential for opportunism of public and/ or private 
contracting party? 
International institutions:  
International constraints on the discretion of the public contracting party 
I.2 International or bilateral monitoring 
1. Are loans from development organizations provided for the transaction, which involve 
monitoring? 
2. Is there any other international or bilateral involvement in the transaction that entails formal or 
informal monitoring? 
3. Do you think the international involvement constrains the discretion of political and 
administrative actors and/ or of the private operator? 
 
 
INTERMEDIARY VARIABLE: REGULATORY REGIME/ TRANSACTION SITUATION 
 
Regulatory regime: Incentives and potential of the political/administrative actors  
and the private operator to manipulate or exploit the contract 
R.1 Degree of occurrence of opportunistic behaviour by political and administrative actors and the 
private operator 
1. Have political or administrative actors or the private operator triggered a renegotiation of the 
contract? 
2. Has the contract during its implementation been changed unilaterally by the government? 
3. Have political or administrative actors attempted to unilaterally change the contract? 
4. Have political/administrative actors or the private operator disregarded contractual rules and 
obligations? 
5. Has the operator regularly and properly reported to the regulator? 
6. Have disagreements emerged between political or administrative actors on the one side and the 
private operator on the other? What was their quality? 
 
R.2 (In-) Effective monitoring and enforcement 
1. Have the administrative capabilities been sufficient to monitor the operator and to apply the 
stipulated enforcement mechanisms? 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  
PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY OPERATED WATER UTILITY 
 
Operator’s success/failure to fulfil obligations and to attain goals and targets set in the contract  
 
Pf.1 (Non-) Compliance of results with contractual obligations, goals and targets at the end of the 
contract 
1. Has the operator fulfilled its obligations and attained the goals and targets set in the contract? 
(Please give figures/ percentages if possible!)  
a. Has the quality of services (water quality, constancy of supply, water/ wastewater 
facilities breakdowns) improved for customers? 
b. Has the financial situation (cost reduction, increased turnover) improved? 
 
 
 
 
  
105
c. Has the technical efficiency (water losses, leak detection programme, unaccounted-for-
water) improved? 
d. Has the operational efficiency (billing, collecting, unaccounted-for-water, accounts 
non-receivable) improved? 
e. Has the (operation) investment capital been used efficiently and effectively? 
(maintenance, repair, replacement of 50.000 water meters per year, GIS based 
information management system) 
f. Has a Customer Service Office been established? What has been its impact? (response 
time for leaks repair) 
g. Has staff been trained and further qualified? 
2. Has the operator received the performance-based bonus? How often and what was its amount? 
3. How do you judge the overall performance of the water utility while being operated by LEMA?   
 
 
 
 
 
